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This thesis traces the electoral behavior of blacks in Atlanta, 
Georgia from their disfranchisement in the early years of this century 
through the election of the city's first black mayor. Organizational 
patterns are examined in an effort to test the appropriateness of the 
exchange model of group behavior. Data regarding demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics, voting and leadership patterns, and 
policy decisions are analyzed to determine the extent to which black 
political power has been maximized in Atlanta. 
Exchange theory provides a useful framework for the study of 
black political behavior as well as criteria for assessing the nature 
of political exchange among white leadership, black political brokers, 
and black voters. It is found that three stages of exchange did exist 
in Atlanta, managed by more than one black leadership group after 
World War Two. Further, the purported black-white voting coalition is 
concluded to have contributed little to the development of black 
political power. 
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Materials for this study were collected from published works 
discussing black politics in Atlanta and the South. Other data were 
gathered from reports, unpublished papers, and interviews of primary 
political actors and students of black political activity in Atlanta. 
This study concludes that exchange patterns did exist in 
Atlanta which are useful for understanding the nature and potential of 
black electoral activity. However, impediments to the maximization of 
political power for blacks remained to impede the solution of problems 
and policies inimical to the welfare of the city's black citizens. 
With careful application and modification, exchange theory surpasses 
interest group theory in its usefulness for the study of black elec¬ 
toral behavior. 
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In political science literature it appears that the politics of 
the Southern region of the United States has been approached as dis¬ 
tinct from the politics of the rest of the nation. Southern politics, 
no doubt, is different because it has been defined by the relationship 
between the races and the efforts on either side to maintain or to 
destroy the manifest structure of that relationship. With this dis¬ 
tinction in mind several scholars have investigated the pattern of 
black political activity in the South. From a review of that litera¬ 
ture one would find that distinctions are made between the "rim South" 
and the "Deep South" and further between urban and rural areas in each 
part of the South. One would also discover that the pattern of polit¬ 
ical activity of black people in Atlanta, Georgia has been at a level 
not generally found among urban black communities of the "Deep South." 
A brief overview of the political activity of blacks in Atlanta 
would reveal that there has been some political activity in the black 
community since as far back as 1868. Before the white primary was 
adopted in 1891 and after it was repealed before being readopted in 
1897 some black voters participated in municipal elections. Even after 
blacks in Georgia were disfranchised, citizenship schools were set up 
in Atlanta's black community in the early 1930s. Blacks could still 
vote in general, open and special elections and the citizenship schools 
1 
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were conducted to acquaint blacks with the structure of local, state 
and national governments as well as to prepare the people for regis¬ 
tration and voting in one of the above elections or in the event that 
the white primary was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.'*' 
Efforts were made to get blacks to register and to vote. Even so, 
black political activity in Atlanta was understandably minimal up to 
the end of World War Two. 
In 19^4 the Supreme Court ruled the white primary unconstitu¬ 
tional in the Texas case of Smith v. Allwright. Then in 1945 the 
Georgia poll tax was repealed. The most crucial event, however, was 
the Supreme Court decision in 1946 in the case of Chapman v. King which 
rendered the white primary in Georgia unconstitutional. After this 
ruling there was a significant and noticeable increase in political 
activity among Atlanta's black citizens. Since that escalation of 
activity in the late 1940s blacks have played an increasingly important 
role in municipal politics. Within this pattern of activity there has 
occurred the emergence and later the demise of black voting organiza¬ 
tions, the development and maintenance of a purported interracial vot¬ 
ing coalition, the emergence of at least two distinct black leadership 
groups, and the proliferation of black officeholding culminating in 
the election of a black mayor. 
Given such a rich history of black political activity the ques¬ 
tion to be investigated in this study askss What has been the nature 
of black electoral activity in Atlanta from disfranchisement to the 
election of a black mayor? Pursuing this question, the writer will 
■*■0. A. Bacote, "The Negro in Atlanta Politics," Phylon 16 
(Fourth Quarter 1955): 342-343. 
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have to investigate several factors: black voting behavior, the poten¬ 
tial political power of blacks in the city, the pattern of black polit¬ 
ical leadership and political organization in the black community. 
After examining that question, an effort will be made to assess the 
significance of the last two mayoral elections during this period in 
terms of their impact on the pattern of black political activity in 
Atlanta. It was in these elections—in 1969 and 1973—that black can¬ 
didates first made serious electoral bids for mayor. 
Scholarly studies of black political activity in Atlanta have 
focused variously on descriptions of blacks' political history in 
2 3 
Atlanta and throughout Georgia, analyses of voting behavior, and 
4 
examinations of black political leadership. While these works discuss 
various aspects of the political behavior of Atlanta's black citizens, 
2 
Augustus Alven Adair, "A Political History of the Negro in 
Atlanta 1908-1953" (Master's thesis, Atlanta University, 1955)* 
Rosetta Sangster McKissack, "Attitudes Toward Negro Political Partici¬ 
pation in Georgia, 1940 to 1947" (Master's thesis, Atlanta University, 
1954); and Geraldine Perry, "The Negro as a Political Factor in Georgia 
1896 to 1912" (Master's thesis, Atlanta University, 1947). See also 
Bacote, "Atlanta Politics," pp. 343-50. 
^Jack Walker, "Negro Voting in Atlanta: 1953 to 1961," Phylon 
24 (Fourth Quarter 1963): 379-87; M. Kent Jennings and Harmon Zeigler, 
"Glass, Party and Race in Four Types of Elections: The Case of Atlanta," 
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the following study attempts to investigate the character of black 
electoral activity within an organizational context and to assess that 
activity in terms of its impact on the maximization of black political 
power. This study departs, furthermore, from the previous works in 
that it will employ the framework of exchange theory which permits a 
discussion of purposive behavior of voters, leaders and organizations 
and suggests developmental stages of group electoral behavior. 
It is necessary at this point to turn to a discussion of that 
theoretical framework. Rather than employ the pluralist model of 
groups or its related model of ethnic group politics the attempt will 
be made here to apply the exchange theory of group politics to our 
study. In order to make the distinction it is necessary to review 
first the major propositions of the pluralist theory of groups. We 
refer here to David Truman's seminal statement of the pluralist theory 
of interest groups as discussed in his book The Governmental Process. 
To begin, one must understand that this theory assumes that groups 
form spontaneously given the social nature of man to join in pursuit of 
5 
collective goals. Second, as society becomes more complex the increas¬ 
ing division of labor contributes to a differentiation of interests and 
a proliferation of groups reflecting these differing interests.^ Thus, 
groups can be identified in terms of shared interests. Further, these 
groups exist in a state of equilibrium; a disruption in this equilibrium 
by social, political or economic forces leads to the formation of new 
^David B. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests 
and Public Opinion (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1951)» pp. 14-15. 
6Ibid., p. 25- 
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groups.7 Fourth, individuals may belong to several interest groups; 
these competing memberships serve to moderate group claims on their 
members. It is important to point out that Truman held that formal 
organization is not necessary for the existence of a group. There 
exist, in his concept, large latent groups which easily can be 
mobilized into collective action. Because of the size of such groups 
they "have the potential to exert considerable impact in the political 
„8 
arena. 
On the other hand, the exchange theory was first put in a 
political context in Mancur Olson's work entitled The Logic of Collec¬ 
tive Action. According to Olson, departure from the pluralist theory 
of groups begins with the assertion that there is a distinction between 
public or "collective" goods which are inseparable benefits that accrue 
to all individuals in a group regardless of the individual members' 
contributions. Such goods can be consumed by all members of a group 
without regard to their individual contribution toward acquiring the 
Q 
collective benefits. An example of a collective good is the fire¬ 
fighting protection provided by a city to its citizens. By contrast, 
there are private "selective" goods which can be given to or withheld 
from individual group members. Such private incentives may be either 
negative, designed to punish the individual for failing to bear a share 
of the costs of group action, or a positive inducement intended to 
^Ibid. , pp. 26-32. 
8Ibid., p. 43. 
9 
Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and 
the Theory of Groups (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), pp. 14-15. 
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reward a specific individual for his contribution to the group costs. 
Furthermore, Olson states that the only rational behavior for an indi¬ 
vidual to contribute to a group would be for a separate selective 
incentive which will stimulate him to act in a group-oriented way. It 
would not be rational for an individual to contribute to group action 
for collective benefits only because he would receive such collective 
goods without sharing the costs of group activity. 
Olson reasoned that individuals will contribute to group action 
only in the expectation that the benefits they receive from their 
action will outweigh the costs of membership; in other words, they 
expect there to be a favorable exchange of benefits. Collective bene¬ 
fits are insufficient incentives to group participation. Large groups 
find it particularly difficult to further their own interests because: 
l) the larger the group, the smaller the fraction of benefit any indi¬ 
vidual member receives; 2) the larger the group, the less likely it 
will be that a small portion of the group will bear a large burden of 
the costs; and 3) the larger the group, the higher are the organiza¬ 
tional costs and thus the greater the obstacle which must be overcome 
before any of the collective good can be obtained. Olson concluded, 
then, that the larger the group the less it will provide of the optimal 
supply of a collective good; and, thus "very large groups normally will 
not, in the absence of coercion, or separate, outside incentives, pro¬ 
vide themselves with even minimal amounts of a collective good. 
We can see, then, that Olson's formulation of the exchange 
10Ibid., p. 51. 
13Tbid. , p. 48. 
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theory challenges some major tenets of the pluralist theory of groups. 
First, Olson's argument questions the pluralists' idea of the "natural 
proliferation of groups" suggesting that people participate in collec¬ 
tive action not just because of shared interests or goals but because 
they expect to receive some benefits they would not otherwise have 
without group membership. Secondly, this author questions the organi¬ 
zational potential and power of Truman's latent group. Olson argued 
that because of the difficulties of providing a favorable exchange 
within the context of large groups, they would be very difficult to 
mobilize and thus hardly would be able to exert power in the political 
arena. Therefore, it can be concluded that the extent of organization 
and representation of interests in the political arena is very spotty, 
and where it does exist is dominated by small "privileged" groups that 
12 
easily can be mobilized for action. 
In an article entitled "An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups" 
Robert Salisbury enlarges and extends the ideas of the exchange theory. 
His major contribution is the conceptualization of four crucial terms: 
l) entrepreneur/organizer, 2) benefits, 3) group member, and 4) exchange. 
Salisbury defines the entrepreneur or organizer as the initiator of an 
enterprise; that is, one who uses capital to generate a set of bene¬ 
fits—goods and services—which he offers to a market of potential 
customers at a price—group membership. It should be noted here that 
entrepreneurs may have their own capital to invest or just as likely, 
■^^Richard Murray and Arnold Vedlitz, "Political Organization in 
Deprived Communities: Black Electoral Groups in Houston, Dallas, and 
New Orleans," paper presented at the 1974 Annual Meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, Chicago, 111., 29 August-2 September, 
1974, p. 3. 
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if not more so, may receive outside subsidization for investment. "If, 
and as long as, enough customers buy, i.e., join, to make a viable 
organization, the group is in business. If the benefits fail, or are 
inadequate to warrant the cost of membership, or the leaders get 
13 
inadequate return, the group collapses. " 
Further, there are three types of benefits: material, soli¬ 
dary and purposive or expressive benefits. Material benefits are, of 
course, tangible rewards of goods or services or the means by which 
these can be obtained (a job), Solidary benefits derive from inter¬ 
personal association among members and include status, socializing, a 
sense of group membership and identification, and so on. Purposive or 
expressive benefits consist of the "realization of suprapersonal goals, 
goals of the organization or group." Such purposive benefits are 
ordinarily collective indivisible benefits such as "good government" or 
civil rights which accrue even to those who made no effort to secure 
them. These benefits also are referred to as expressive because they 
can be derived, according to Salisbury, by the expression of certain 
values. For example, opposition to the Vietnam War and the desire for 
a foreign policy of peaceful non-intervention are examples of values 
whose public expression may be achieved by joining a group. "The point 
14 
here is that benefits are derived from the expression itself." 
So, the entrepreneur/organizer invests capital to develop a set 
of benefits which may be any sort of combination of the three types. 
13 
Robert H. Salisbury, "An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups," 
Midwest Journal of Political Science 13 (February 1969): 11. 
Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
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These he offers at a price-group membership—to a market, that is, a 
range of people the entrepreneur wants to attract. The market consists 
of group members: the potential consumers of benefits offered by the 
entrepreneur. Group members have preferences that define them as part 
of a latent or potential group. A group is only identifiable if a set 
of benefits is offered by an entrepreneur/organizer to which the poten¬ 
tial group members respond. Remember here that a group can be organized 
and sustained only if the group members' and entrepreneurs' benefits 
exceed the costs of membership and investment.'^ 
Finally, Salisbury defines exchange as the flow of benefits to 
both members and organizers. There must be a mutually satisfactory 
exchange, that is, an adequate flow of benefits in order to be suffi¬ 
cient to sustain an organization. Furthermore, the author contends 
that entrepreneurs must have a return sufficient to pay the costs of 
benefits plus realize some profit. 
Before moving to another aspect of this discussion, it seems 
important to note two additional points Salisbury makes in his article. 
First, the author equates the entrepreneur/organizer role with group 
leadership. He writes that: "It is, therefore, group leadership that 
we are discussing in a framework of benefit exchange. The entrepre¬ 
neurial role is generically identical with that of leader: the leader 
is perforce an entrepreneur. In discussing the entrepreneurial role 
Salisbury suggests that these initiators invest capital to create 
benefits, and that often this capital is derived as a subsidy or legacy 
^Ibid. , pp. 22-23. 
16 
Ibid., p. 29. 
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of other older organizations. Given this subsidization, Salisbury con¬ 
cludes that the emergence of organized groups will tend to be a gradual 
process dependent in part on the recruitment and development of organ¬ 
izers and will tend also to depend on the accumulation of "social capi- 
17 
tal sufficient to invest in the formation of durable organizations." 
It would be helpful to turn here to a discussion of exchange 
theory in a paper by Richard Murray and Arnold Vedlitz. Their work 
is instructive in that it contains two sections of particular interest 
here: l) the discussion regarding the applicability of exchange theory 
to electoral organizations, and 2) their conclusion that three organi¬ 
zational phases occur in electoral organizations. 
In approaching the question of the applicability of the 
exchange theory to black electoral groups in three southern cities, 
Murray and Vedlitz, in their paper entitled "Political Organization in 
Deprived Communities: Black Electoral Groups in Houston, Dallas, and 
New Orleans," examine the history of electoral organizations. The 
political machine was the first of such large scale organizations. Its 
emergence was confined primarily to northeast American cities. Murray 
and Vedlitz number several environmental factors which account for the 
preponderance of machines in this region. They were: l) that indus¬ 
trialization and urbanization required large numbers of workers sup¬ 
plied by the large immigrant labor force; 2) that this industrializa¬ 
tion was accompanied by the accumulation of wealth in the hands of a 
small number of businessmen; 3) that because of the large populations 
in cities there was a need for a municipal structure adequate to provide 
17 Ibid., pp. 14-15. 
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services to the inhabitants; 4) that local government control depended 
on who obtained and controlled the votes; and 5) that the dominance of 
a materialistic culture provided an atmosphere in which tangible 
material benefits were "acceptable and effective incentives for pro- 
l8 
moting group political activity." 
The local political machine relied on the use of public 
resources in the exchange pattern among voters, public officials, 
businessmen, public employees and outside political authorities. Once 
a group controlled the governmental apparatus it could use public 
resources (i.e., public funds, jobs, contracts, etc.) to subsidize the 
group enterprise. There are several notable factors regarding the 
exchange pattern of the political machine. First, it depended on a 
large group of voters who were unfamiliar with the civic culture of 
the United States and who were relatively impoverished. Secondly, the 
machine dealt in tangible benefits using public resources and offering 
separate, selective incentives to individual participants. Many of the 
problems of mobilization and maintenance were solved by the access to 
and use of the large reserve of public resources. Third, the role of 
the entrepreneur was central to this exchange pattern. The entrepre¬ 
neur was key in each exchange; he maintained tight control over the 
process, and, thus, was able to discourage independent relationships 
between others involved in the exchange. One might add that the bene¬ 
fits to the entrepreneurs in this situation were substantial tangible 
19 
and solidary rewards—power, status, and, of course, wealth. 
18 
Murray and Vedlitz, "Political Organization," p. 5« 
19Ibid., pp. 5-8. 
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Since the heyday of political machines, "market" conditions have 
changed making such political organization as that maintained by 
machines unsustainable. One of these changes is evident in the fact 
that the immigration restrictions of the 1920s aborted the supply of 
immigrants needed by the machine. Secondly, Murray and Vedlitz point 
out that the electorate experienced an improved material status and 
began to acquire a "vote as civic duty ethic" thereby reducing the 
demand for and the effectiveness of the machines' offers of material 
incentives. These changes were accompanied by the development of a 
large federal bureaucracy which delivered tangible benefits to needy 
citizens. The machines could not hope to compete with this public 
bureaucracy that was subsidized by the resources of the federal govern¬ 
ment. Furthermore, the emergence of civil service refoims, legal 
restrictions (especially over such areas as contracts, for example) and 
state regulations of party organization also contributed to the demise 
of the political machine. 
Because of such changed conditions in the political environment 
and new legal restrictions, electoral organizations now play a minimal 
role in most American cities. The exchange pattern of the modem elec¬ 
toral organization is markedly different from that of the political 
machine. The entrepreneurs no longer control interaction in the polit¬ 
ical arena; there are few material resources available and allegiance is 
fleeting. Murray and Vedlitz note that organizations depend heavily on 
solidary and purposive incentives to organizational participation. 
Because of the lack of selective benefits membership is highly tran¬ 
sient. Further, without control of a large portion of the electorate 
13 
such associations have little exchange with candidates or with elected 
officials. 
Authors Murray and Vedlitz suggest that an exchange pattern 
exists that is characterized by a triangular exchange among organized 
interests, elected officials and public bureaucracies. Organized 
interests have the advantages of; l) specified, highly focused 
interests, 2) sustained contact and thus enhanced influence with offi¬ 
cials and bureaucracies, and 3) "the fact that they provide resources 
required for the candidate-voter exchange enabling them to manipulate 
this interaction. Although voter contact with the three major elements 
in the exchange is enhanced because of these factors, voter control 
over the exchange is reduced. "The 'new machines' are relatively 
irresponsible in that public policies are shaped without control by a 
21 
higher authority amenable to voter desires." 
In contrast to the demise of electoral organizations in Ameri¬ 
can cities, black electoral organizations have emerged in cities in 
both the North and South since the end of World War Two. Murray and 
Vedlitz note that there has been considerable black organizational 
activity in the South since the conclusion of the Second World War. 
Several factors appear to have facilitated this development. They were; 
1) the gradual elimination of legal barriers to voting by blacks; 
2) the rapid urbanization of the black population in the South; 3) the 
lessening of organizational problems precipitated by lowered communica¬ 
tion costs and less vulnerability to pressures discouraging black 
20Ibid., pp. 9-U. 
21 
Ibid., p. 12. 
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political participation; and, finally 4) widespread racial conscious¬ 
ness among Hacks. One of the crucial reasons for the emergence of 
"black political organizations was the lack of communication "between 
white political structures and "black communities; there was very 
limited ability to initiate and maintain interaction between racial 
groups. Secondly, because of the lower social and economic status of 
blacks, there was the need for material, welfare benefits in the black 
22 
community. 
This situation of mutual need was conducive to entrepreneurial 
initiative; organizers used the opportunity to establish electoral 
organizations and oversee an exchange of benefits between the interested 
groups. The promise of black voter support was exchanged for policies 
beneficial to the black community. The black entrepreneurial leader¬ 
ship negotiated with the white political structure for policies and 
provisions favorable to the interests of their community. On the other 
hand, the leadership offered cues to black voters as to what candidates 
or policies were most favorably disposed to black interests and, there¬ 
fore, merited black support. 
It should be pointed out that incentives for black voters were 
more often collective and purposive benefits rather than the selective 
material rewards of the old political machine. This was the case 
because whites did not have sufficient resources to offer selective 
benefits to large numbers of individual blacks and, further, because 
white elites faced heavy sanctions from the white community if they 
were considered too sympathetic to black demands. The black 
22Ibid., PP. 13-14. 
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entrepreneur/organizers, on the other hand, received any of a combina¬ 
tion of the three kinds of rewards: material payoffs, solidary bene¬ 
fits of a sense of high status and a sense of power, and purposive 
rewards such as feeling that their efforts advanced the cause of their 
people. 
However, as Murray and Vedlitz suggest, there were two out¬ 
standing problems in this exchange pattern. First, selective material 
benefits were not generally available for black voters; therefore, 
there was the problem not only of organizing the vote but of getting 
blacks to register and vote. This was usually solved when an issue 
clearly related to the interests of the black community was involved in 
a campaign. In this situation group consciousness could be activated 
to provide large black turnout and group consensus voting. A second 
problem threatened to emerge where the interests of the entrepreneurs 
might be opposed to that of the voters. Where the leadership accepted 
rewards from candidates or officials favorably disposed to black 
interests there was no conflict. But often those whites with the most 
power and better resources with which to offer incentives to black 
organizers were the most conservative and less likely to support the 
economic and social policies considered to be in the interests of the 
entire black community. Thus, the acceptance of benefits by the 
entrepreneurial leadership might have the possibility of directly con- 
23 
flicting with the general interest of the black community. 
As a conclusion to this discussion of the exchange theory as a 
theoretical framework for the present study we turn to Murray's and 
23 'ibid. , p. 16. 
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Vedlitz' conclusion that there are three organizational phases which 
can be discerned in an examination of black politics. They point out 
that their finding serves to confirm the propositions of the exchange 
theory of Olson and Salisbury and at the same time argue against the 
natural proliferation contention of the pluralist theory of groups. 
The first organizational phase of black electoral politics in 
the South occurred after some of the legal barriers to black partici¬ 
pation were removed and significant numbers of blacks began to register 
and vote. According to pluralist theory it would be expected that this 
disequilibrium in the political arena would produce a new proliferation 
of groups to represent new interests and restore balance to the polit¬ 
ical system. Exchange theory would suggest, on the other hand, that 
the new potential group—the black electorate—would have difficulty 
organizing because of its large size and lack of resources. Murray and 
Vedlitz observe that new voter organizations did emerge but were 
inefficiently organized and minimally maintained and, thus, were unable 
to "unite the potential group to secure favorable action." 
The second phase occurred with the emergence of black organiza¬ 
tions based on political exchange. Characteristic of these organiza¬ 
tions was the outside subsidization required for their creation. The 
reward incentives for entrepreneurial organization and the payment for 
start-up costs came from resources outside of the black community. 
Phase three "occurs when the black electorate reaches a level of 
sophistication where it no longer needs organization-provided cues 
and/or when a substantial number of candidates arrive on the scene who 
can communicate directly with black voters." Such changes destroy the 
market utilized by the organizational leadership and undermine their 
17 
ability to continue to recruit resources needed to provide benefits 
24 
within their operation. It might also be added that these changes 
subvert the leadership role as key in the exchange process diminishing 
the need for its interjection and eliminating its control over the 
exchange. 
The exchange theory will provide the theoretical framework for 
this study of black electoral behavior in Atlanta, Georgia since the 
decade of the 1940s. In addition to examining major trends in the 
development of black electoral activity in Atlanta, there will be an 
effort to analyze the exchange process that occurred between white 
candidates and elected officials, black entrepreneur/organizers, and 
black voters. We will observe the flow of benefits among the parties 
involved in this process noting particularly its effect on the interests 
of the black community, on its leadership structure, and on efforts to 
maximize black political power. 
Having discussed the theoretical framework it seems pertinent 
to move to a brief discussion of the methodology and structure of this 
paper. The intent is that this paper will be a descriptive study of 
black electoral behavior in Atlanta. The major data for the paper will 
come from a review of literature concerning not only black political 
activity in Atlanta but also of literature regarding black political 
activity in the South. There are several articles examining Atlanta 
black politics in particular as well as studies dealing with black 
electoral behavior in recent elections. This material will be supple¬ 
mented by information obtained from interviews with selected persons in 
24 
Ibid., p. 38. 
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the black community who can provide information regarding benefit 
exchange. 
The text of this investigation will be presented in four 
chapters. Each of the following three chapters will discuss a par¬ 
ticular time period in the history of black electoral behavior in 
Atlanta. 
The second chapter will examine the period characterized by 
disfranchisement of black voters, from the beginning of this century 
until the 1946 judicial dissolution of "legal" barriers to black vot¬ 
ing. The next period marks the beginning of large scale voter partici¬ 
pation in this century and encompasses the emergence of organizations 
which relied on the black vote as its instrument for exchange. These 
years from 1946 through the 1960s will be examined in Chapter Three. 
Chapter Four provides a view of black efforts to capture political con¬ 
trol of the city's highest elected offices and the impact of these 
efforts on the exchange process. This chapter culminates in an analy¬ 
sis of the election of a black mayor in 1973- The fifth and final 
chapter will put forth the writer's conclusions. It will attempt to 
assess the applicability of exchange theory to black political activity 
in Atlanta, Georgia and point to the impact of black electoral and 
organizational behavior on the maximization of black political power. 
Each of the chapters dealing with a particular time period will 
include a review of the political atmosphere of the time and an assess¬ 
ment of the potential political power of the black community. In look¬ 
ing at potential power we will need to gather data on population, voting 
and voter registration, and socioeconomic status among blacks. Essen¬ 
tial in each chapter will be an examination of the organizational and 
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leadership configurations that characterized the period under discus¬ 
sion. This will necessitate a recounting of the emergence and develop¬ 
ment of electoral organization as well as an analysis of the exchange 
pattern involved. Finally, each period will he assessed to determine 
the stage of organizational activity and the progress made toward 
maximizing "black political power at that stage. 
Finally, it seems appropriate at this point to offer defini¬ 
tions for key concepts to he used in this study. The notion of polit¬ 
ical power is generic to any discussion of electoral behavior. Here 
political power will mean the ability to influence or persuade some 
person(s) to do what they were not otherwise predisposed to do. This 
exercise of power is distinguished from potential political power which 
would include those characteristics of a community such as population 
distribution, voter registration, voting, office holding and socio¬ 
economic status. These are merely potential sources of political 
power. Another concept, that of maximizing political power involves 
utilizing those resources to do three things: l) obtain benefits for 
the community, 2) prevent the formulation of any policy inimical to the 
community, and 3) develop and include (or have included) in the policy¬ 
making process an agenda of items which are in the interests of the 
community. 
In addition to these, we will define the concept of political 
leadership as the ability to influence and to represent a given group. 
Political leadership is so defined in this case to include those black 
political leaders in Atlanta who were designated as such because they 
had been perceived and designated by whites as leaders, particularly in 
the period prior to widespread black participation in political life. 
20 
This definition, of course, includes those "black political leaders con¬ 
sidered as such by the black community irrespective of white choices. 
It also should be pointed out that in our attempts to determine the 
significance of certain events on a pattern of black political activity, 
the term significance will indicate the impact of an event which causes 
a perceptible change in a pattern of activity. Having set forth the 
framework and having discussed the mechanics of this paper we now will 
turn to the text of the study. 
CHAPTER II 
DISFRANCHISEMENT ERA 
As a first step in this descriptive study of "black electoral 
"behavior in Atlanta, this chapter will examine black political activity 
during the period of disfranchisement (189? to 19^). The activity 
which took place during this period was a foundation upon which black 
political behavior developed once legal barriers to black voting were 
removed. Even though the period of disfranchisement was characterized 
by severely restricted black electoral activity, there existed elements 
of political exchange which were precedents for later patterns of black 
political behavior in Atlanta. 
In the period just after the Civil War from 1868 to 1872, 
black political participation in Atlanta and in Georgia was exercised 
through the Republican Party. However, as the end of the Reconstruc¬ 
tion Era drew near, the influence of the Republican Party began to wane. 
In order to take part effectively in the political life of the city, 
black Atlantans increasingly found it necessary to participate in 
politics within the framework of the Democratic Party. Black votes 
were sought only when white voters were divided. 
On the state level, in 1877—the year that marks the end of 
Reconstruction—a new state constitution was adopted in Georgia. This 
new constitution levied a cumulative poll tax on voters and mandated 
rigid enforcement of residential requirements. The new law served to 
21 
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restrict black voting. Even so, many eligible blacks continued to vote 
and to participate in the political life of the city."*' 
During the 1880s and 1890s, Atlanta's politics were rife with 
corruption and bitter political battles for which blacks were blamed. 
As a result of this strife and of resentment of black participation in 
these struggles, in 1891 the Executive Committee of Atlanta’s Demo¬ 
cratic Party adopted the white primary, prohibiting blacks from voting 
in election primaries. Since the Democratic Party was the only vehicle 
for effective voter participation, blacks virtually were denied the 
right to vote. In 1895» however, the Democratic Executive Committee 
reversed this decision, probably because the Democrats needed allies 
in the face of growing opposition to their machine which controlled 
city government.2 
In spite of this reversal, black voting was not to continue 
for long. Black votes proved critical in electoral battles between 
the Democratic and Populist Parties, providing Democrats with the 
margin of victory. In the state elections of 1896, the Populists 
suffered a defeat which virtually destroyed their party. As a result, 
the black vote no longer was needed to maintain Democratic hegemony. 
The city Democratic Executive Committee, therefore, in 1897 readopted 
the white primary. Because there was no Republican or Populist opposi¬ 
tion in general elections, the Democratic primary was the locus of vic¬ 
tory or defeat. Victory in this primary was tantamount to election. 
"*"C. A. Bacote, "The Negro in Atlanta Politics," Phylon 16 
(Fourth Quarter 1955): 333« 
2Ibid. , p. 338-34-1. 
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Unable to vote in city Democratic primaries, blacks were denied parti¬ 
cipation in Atlanta politics. 
As if this was not enough to prevent black voting, a bill revis¬ 
ing the state constitution and designed to eliminate black voting 
altogether was passed by the Georgia General Assembly in 190?. This 
amendment to the state constitution was approved by Georgia voters in 
a referendum in the 1908 election. The amendment contained several 
qualifications for voting including education, character and property 
3 
requirements as well as a grandfather clause. These measures, 
together with the white primary, served to disfranchise black Georgians 
almost totally. 
At the same time, there was a movement afoot within the Repub¬ 
lican Party to purge blacks from its rolls. This "lily white movement" 
was precipitated by a 1908 ruling prohibiting blacks from voting in the 
Republican primary and in meetings selecting convention delegates. 
Such efforts were effective in eradicating most remnants of black vot¬ 
ing in Georgia. Further, this movement took away federal patronage 
4 
from blacks. While the attempt to remove blacks from the Republican 
Party may have hampered black political participation in that party, 
it was not entirely successful because by 1912 the Republican Party 
membership in Georgia was mostly black.^ 
It should be pointed out that such moves to disfranchise black 
3 
Augustus Alven Adair, "A Political History of the Negro in 
Atlanta 1908-1953" (Master's thesis, Atlanta University, 1955)» pp. 4-6. 
Vbid., pp. 18-19. 
^Geraldine Perry, "The Negro as a Political Factor in Georgia 
I896 to 1912" (Master's thesis, Atlanta University, 1947), p. 38. 
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Atlantans met with some resistance. Early protest was led by the 
Atlanta Independent, a newspaper owned and edited by Benjamin Davis, a 
prominent black Republican. Davis was joined by the Equal Rights 
League, a statewide organization formed in 1906 in which tf. E. B. 
Dubois was a prominent leader. Together these forces attempted to 
organize black voters to defeat the constitutional amendment designed 
to disfranchise them.^ When that move was unsuccessful, Ben Davis 
formed the Organization for Effective Party Work in 1909. This group, 
many of whose members were Republicans, attempted to revise the dis¬ 
franchisement laws adopted the previous year. Such efforts were unsuc¬ 
cessful. Davis also was prominent in the fight against the "lily white 
movement" in the Republican Party. 
Despite their inability to affect local decision-making via 
the vote, black Atlantans still expressed an interest in national 
politics. They were encouraged to do so by Davis through the Atlanta 
Independent newspaper. However, the protest against disfranchisement 
measures appears to have been "the only real attempt by the Negroes in 
Atlanta to take an active part in local politics between 1909 and 
1916."7 
Although black Georgians were denied the right to vote in party 
primaries, they were able to register freely and to vote in general, 
open and special elections. Black people in Atlanta did vote when such 
an opportunity was present. In most of these elections, the black vote 
proved significant, if not crucial, to the outcomes. 
6Ibid., p. 28. 
7Adair, "A Political History," p. 21. 
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In 1921 two elections were held in an attempt by the school 
board to get voter approval for the issue of $4 million in bonds. 
Twice the measure was defeated with black voters opposing it. Prior 
to the third school bond referendum, the President of the Board of 
Education and the mayor met with black leaders. It is reported that 
in this meeting the white leaders promised that one and one-quarter to 
one and one-third million dollars of the bond total would be used to 
build new schools for black children and to improve the old equipment 
in schools in the city's black community. Subsequently, the school 
bond referendum was passed with the overwhelming support of Atlanta's 
black voters.^ 
Again in 1929» black Atlantans had an opportunity to vote. The 
Fifth District Congressional seat had been vacated by the death of 
Representative Leslie J. Steele. Because his replacement was to be 
selected in a special election, black people were allowed to vote. 
Although there were only 3»301 blacks registered to vote in Fulton 
County at the time, the black vote is considered critical in this elec¬ 
tion outcome because only about 9»^00 people voted. The black vote 
percentage in that election is reported to have been rather large. 
Further, the election itself was significant because it was one of the 
few times during the period of disfranchisement when a white candidate 
9 
appealed for black voter support. 
There was an effort to recall an incumbent mayor in 1932, 
0 
Paul Lewison, Race, Class and Party: A History of Negro Suf¬ 
frage and White Politics in the South (New York: Grossett and Dunlap, 
1932), pp. 150-151. 
^Adair, "A Political History," p. 33« 
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giving black voters another opportunity to go to the polls. Mayor 
James L. Key had been accused of forgery and misrepresentation, and 
over 5«000 citizens petitioned to hold a recall election. Mayor Key 
was an outspoken political figure who had "insisted upon fair treatment 
of all citizens regardless of color." In addition, the fact that he 
had fought for better schools for black children was not lost upon 
Atlanta's black citizens. Under the leadership of the local chapter of 
the National Association of Colored People (NAACP), the Neighborhood 
Union, and the Atlanta Teachers' Union, several hundred previously 
unregistered black Atlantans registered to vote in this election. 
Black voters gave their unequivocal support to Mayor Key and, in doing 
so, helped defeat the recall effort."^ It appears that the organiza¬ 
tional effort used to maximize the black vote in this election was a 
deliberate effort to demonstrate the voting strength of Atlanta's 
black population.The effort was successful in part because black 
voters contributed to retaining an elected official who had acted in 
their interest previously and had demonstrated a concern for the fair 
treatment of blacks. On the other hand, there were 6,000 blacks 
eligible to vote. Of that number, only 2,500 registered and less than 
one thousand voted in the recall election. 
During this time there was a concern over what has been referred 
to as the "complete political apathy" of black people in Atlanta. The 
black vote was far from its maximum level in elections in which black 
Atlantans could vote. Under the stimulus of Attorney A. T. Walden, 
■^Bacote, "Atlanta Politics," p. 3^2. 
^Adair, "A Political History," p. 42. 
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president of the local NAACP, and of Mrs. John Hope, wife of the presi¬ 
dent of Morehouse College and Atlanta University, citizenship schools 
were established. The citizenship schools were conducted for six weeks 
for the purpose of instructing potential black voters on the structure 
of local, state and national governments, as well as on the procedures 
for registration and voting. The classes were held at churches in the 
community and at the Butler Street Young Men's Christian Association 
(YMCA), the only chapter of that national organization reserved for 
blacks in the city. Along with the NAACP, many pastors and members of 
the academic community were instrumental in developing and operating 
the citizenship schools. In particular, Dr. C. A. Bacote directed 
their operation in 1932, and from 1933 until 1938 Dr. Rayford Logan 
took over that task. Both were members of the Atlanta University 
faculty. 
Although the restrictions against black voting were prohibi¬ 
tive, it was considered important for black voters to be prepared and 
registered for three reasons: 
l) to be eligible to participate in open and special elec¬ 
tions, 2) to be ready to vote in the general election in 
case an independent Democrat was dissatisfied with the 
results of the primary and decided to run in the general 
election, thereby seeking the Negro vote, 3) to be pre¬ 
pared in case the United States Supreme Court should ever 
decide that the white primary was unconstitutional.^ 
Hundreds of black Atlantans "graduated" from the citizenship 
schools from their inception in 1932 until 1938. Although the voter 
consciousness of many blacks had been raised, the statistics indicate 
that registration figures continued to lag far behind the numbers of 
"''^Bacote, "Atlanta Politics," p. 3^2. 
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blacks eligible to vote. In 1930, before the advent of the citizen¬ 
ship schools, there were only 500 blacks registered to vote although 
blacks comprised one-third of Atlanta's population. In 1932, over 
2,500 blacks registered to vote, most probably as a result of the 
citizenship schools' work as well as of the recall election which pre¬ 
sented an issue important to the community. It is reported, however, 
13 that registration figures fell by 1935 to 1,500 without a significant 
increase in city registration figures until 1940 when the number of 
14 
registered black voters was recorded at 2,015. 
In 1934 an organization was established for the express purpose 
of "improving the economic, political and social conditions of the 
Negroes of Atlanta and Fulton County through the use of the ballot."^ 
John Wesley Dobbs, a prominent black Republican, organized the Atlanta 
Civic and Political League (Aon) whose immediate goal was to increase 
voter registration among Atlanta's black population. Mass rallies were 
held and several campaigns were launched by the ACEL between 1934 and 
1946 to do just that. However, these campaigns met with dubious suc¬ 
cess since they did not result in registering large numbers of eligible 
blacks. 
In a restatement of the Atlanta Civic and Political League's 
objectives in 1936, the leadership outlined several specific things it 
planned to achieve through maximizing the black vote. These included: 
13Adair, "A Political History," pp. 32, 33, 41, 47. 
14 
Rosetta Sangster McKissack, "Attitudes Toward Negro Political 
Participation in Georgia, 1940 to 1947" (Master's thesis, Atlanta 
University, 1954), p. 43. 
"^Atlanta Daily World, March 25, 1936, p. 6. 
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l) better parks and playgrounds in the black community; 2) gaining the 
right for black physicians to practice medicine at Grady Hospital (the 
major regional medical facility for Atlanta and Fulton County resi¬ 
dents) ; 3) better schools and better conditions for teachers in terms 
of wages and general working conditions; and, 4) the hiring of black 
policemen and firemen."^ 
Membership in the ACPL was open to any black person in Atlanta 
or Fulton County who was a registered voter. At the same time leader¬ 
ship in the organization consisted of prominent community representa¬ 
tives, many of whom were active Republicans. Among the prominent mem¬ 
bers of the Atlanta Civic and Political League were W. J. Shaw, Secre¬ 
tary in the Republican Party; Reverend Martin Luther King, Sr., pastor 
of Ebeneezer Baptist Church; H. W. Russell and W. H. Aiken, local con¬ 
tractors; C. L. Harper, principal of the Booker T. Washington High 
School; Mrs. Geneva Haugabrooks, owner of a funeral home; J. B. Blayton, 
owner of the black radio station, WEED; C. A. Scott, publisher of the 
black newspaper, the Atlanta Daily World; and A. T. Walden, a prominent 
lawyer and president of the local NAACP chapter. 
Briefly, it is important to point out that while the president 
of the Atlanta Civic and Political League, John Wesley Dobbs, its 
organizer, also was Grand Master of the Prince Hall Masons in Georgia. 
Dobbs used his position in that largely black fraternal order to promote 
registration and political education. His organizing was not confined 
to the city. He travelled throughout Georgia and, in doing so, was 
instrumental in the work of the Georgia Voters League, a statewide 
16 
Ibid., p. 1. 
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organization designed to maximize the black vote. Further, Dobbs was 
a prominent black Republican. It has been reported that the "Negro 
Republican mantle" was passed from Benjamin Davis to Dobbs and W. J. 
17 
Shaw. Because of this, Dobbs is considered the leader of black 
Republicans in Atlanta from the 1930s until the time of his death. 
In addition to the emergence of the ACPL, 193^ also spawned the 
Colored Voters League, the organizer of which was J. T. Carlton. The 
only discernible difference in purpose between this organization and 
the ACPL appears to be that the Colored Voters League attempted to 
broaden its scope to include registration of blacks throughout Fulton 
County. It seems, however, that the Colored Voters League was neither 
as prominent nor as effective in its efforts as the Atlanta Civic and 
Political League. 
Because the leadership of the Atlanta Civic and Political 
League was predominantly Republican, several Democrats broke away from 
that organization in 1937* Led by Attorney A. T. Walden and newspaper 
publisher C. A. Scott, these Democrats formed the Citizens Democratic 
18 
Club of Fulton County. 
In 1938» black people in Fulton County, of which most of 
Atlanta is a part, participated in two county elections. One election 
was for sheriff of Fulton County. The other was a referendum which 
proposed to legalize the sale of liquor in Atlanta and the county. 
17 
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Although some black voters did take part in these elections, neither 
one appears to hold any significance for the discussion at hand. 
The year 1944 marked the beginning of a new era in Southern 
politics. In that year, the United States Supreme Court declared 
unconstitutional the white primary in the Texas case of Smith versus 
19 
Allwright. That decision had the potential for impacting all of the 
states where segregation ruled at the ballot box. White Georgians 
reacted with characteristic belligerence. They took the position that 
the Texas decision did not affect Georgia and steadfastly refused to 
allow black voters to participate in primaries. In fact, a subcommittee 
of the Georgia Democratic Party's Executive Committee adopted a resolu¬ 
tion in June of that year affirming that only whites would be allowed 
20 
to vote in the forthcoming July primary. 
As a result of the Supreme Court decision and the intransigence 
of white election officials, black Democrats decided to bring suit in 
Georgia in order "to ascertain if the United States Supreme Court deci¬ 
sion on the Texas Democratic primary applies to the Democratic primary 
21 
machinery in Georgia." Twenty members of the Citizens Democratic 
Club's Executive Committee presented themselves to vote in the July 4th 
primary but were turned away. This denial provided grounds for the 
suit filed in U.S. District Court in the name of Reverend Primus King 
■^U.S. Supreme Court Reports, Smith v. Allwright, 1943 (321 U.S. 
649-670), p. 987. 
90 
McKissack, "Attitudes," pp. 26-27. 
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alleging violation of civil rights. Georgia Governor Ellis Arnall 
later offered assistance to county registrars fighting suits against 
denials of blacks' right to vote. 
A significant event succeeding these court actions occurred in 
1945. The Georgia State Legislature, reportedly under the leadership 
of Governor Arnall, repealed the poll tax and lowered the voting age to 
eighteen (18). At first glance the poll tax repeal appears to have 
been a liberal move with the potential of breaking down the barriers to 
black electoral participation. However, figures indicated that as a 
result of the poll tax, for every one black that was kept from voting, 
23 
six (6) whites also were prohibited from using the ballot. J In the 
face of a Supreme Court mandate allowing blacks to vote, it appears 
that Georgia legislators seized the opportunity—through repeal of the 
poll tax—to encourage as many whites as possible to vote. 
Thus, in September 1945, in spite of the Supreme Court decision 
regarding the Texas primary, black Atlantans were not allowed to vote in 
the Democratic Party primary election that selected candidates for 
mayor and thirty-nine (39) other posts. As it happened, just after 
this election the Federal District Court announced its decision declar¬ 
ing Georgia's white primary unconstitutional. Even so, white resis¬ 
tance to black voting remained high, and the case was appealed to the 
U.S. Court of Appeals. 
The year 1946 presented an opportunity for black Atlantans to 
vote. The incumbent Fifth District Congressman Robert Ramspeck 
22McKissack, "Attitudes," pp. 28-29. 
23Ibid., pp. 21-22. 
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resigned from office. Because his replacement had to he selected in a 
special election, blacks could vote. Several black organizations 
spearheaded a drive to register large numbers of blacks. It appeared 
that the effort might be more successful in light of the poll tax 
repeal. The local NAAGP, the Atlanta Civic and Political League, 
black ministers and clubs, and the Atlanta Daily World newspaper led 
the drive to register blacks to vote in this election. Registered 
black voters numbered only 3»000 in 1945. By the end of this campaign 
2/j, 
in the first months of 1946, 6,876 blacks had qualified to vote. 
In the special Congressional election for a Fifth District 
Representative, the black vote was critical. Although nineteen (19) 
candidates announced for this election, only five (5) or six (6) made 
an open appeal for black support. The record of former state legis¬ 
lator Helen Douglas Mankin, together with her "willingness to seek the 
Negro vote" garnered for her the support of the black community. On 
election day, February 12, 1946, with all precincts—except the black 
Precinct B in the Third Ward—reporting, Tom Camp held the lead over 
Mrs. Mankin by 156 votes. Of the more than one thousand votes cast in 
that black precinct, Mankin received 956 votes, giving her an 800 vote 
victory margin over Camp. Again, the black vote had proved critical to 
25 
the outcome of an Atlanta election. 
On April 1, 1946, the U.S. Supreme Court—in the case of 
26 
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Federal District Court and reaffirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals. In 
doing so, the Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' rulings that 
declared Georgia's white primary unconstitutional. There were demands 
made from many quarters that the governor convene a special session of 
the state legislature in order that some way might be created to cir- 
27 
cumvent the ruling. Governor Arnall refused such appeals. Although 
under the gubernatorial leadership of Herman Talmadge—appointed at the 
death of his father Eugene—the white primary later was readopted, this 
court ruling effectively eliminated the all-white party primary from 
Atlanta politics. 
The anticipation by blacks of a favorable decision was seen in 
the mobilization of black Atlantans in a city-wide registration cam¬ 
paign aimed at organizing black voters for the 19^6 gubernatorial elec¬ 
tion. This race provided incentive for black participation because the 
leading contender was ex-governor Eugene Talmadge who was running on a 
white-supremacist platform. By his previous record and by his promises 
to pursue racist policies, Talmadge defined himself as unalterably 
opposed to black interests and, thus, provided the momentum for a 
large black turnout. 
A small group of black community leaders recognized the need 
for a large black vote and, at the same time, acknowledged that pre¬ 
vious efforts had not been successful in reaching the masses of poten¬ 
tial black voters. A coalition of organizations, under the leadership 
of the local NAAGP chapter, formed the All-Citizens Registration 
^Bacote, "Atlanta Politics," p. 3^- 
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Committee designed to canvass and register blacks wherever they resided 
in the city. 
The campaign began on March 6, 1946, prior to the Supreme Court 
decision. It employed the support and energies of several groups in 
addition to the NAACP, including the Atlanta Civic and Political 
League, the organization of black Democrats, the Atlanta Urban League, 
Butler Street YMCA, fraternities and clubs, as well as individual 
ministers, businessmen and the hundreds of workers who walked mile 
after mile registering blacks from block to block. The All-Citizens 
Registration Committee campaign was a vigorous one that attempted to 
reach every voting age black person in the city. When the campaign 
closed in May 1946—after the Supreme Court ruling had been rendered— 
24,137 blacks were registered to vote in Fulton County, 21,244 of whom 
28 
were registered voters living within the city limits of Atlanta. 
Furthermore, between the time of this campaign in 1946 and 1948, 
approximately 25«000 blacks were registered to vote under the impetus 
of the All-Citizens Registration Committee. 
In an effort to encourage these newly registered voters to use 
the ballot, the local NAACP reactivated the citizenship schools. These 
sessions, held throughout the black community, informed blacks about 
government structure, procedures for using voting machines, prominent 
issues, and the records of the various candidates in the 1946 guberna¬ 
torial campaign. Although blacks voted heavily in this election, 
Talmadge won the governor's xa.ce. 
It should be noted also that there were widespread attempts to 
28 
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purge black voters from the registration lists throughout the state. 
Such moves were fought by the black State Association of Citizens' 
Democratic Clubs including the local Citizens Democratic Club of 
Fulton County. A federal investigation forced many names to be put 
29 
back on the lists. At any rate, this appears not to have been a 
significant problem for black voters in Atlanta. 
In summary, black Atlantans clearly were denied the right to 
vote in major elections for nearly a half-century. In spite of such 
prohibitions, however, black voters made the most of the few oppor¬ 
tunities to vote that presented themselves, such as special elections 
and referenda. In several of these, the black vote proved decisive in 
the election outcome. While this vote was critical in many circum¬ 
stances, it must be pointed out that those blacks who did vote in these 
elections never numbered more than a few thousand or more than a very 
small percentage of the potential black electorate. On the other 
hand, a cross-section of community, business, and religious leaders, 
on several occasions, attempted to raise and maintain the community's 
consciousness of voting. Until 19^-6, however, such efforts failed to 
reach the masses of black citizens. In light of such activities, it is 
important to turn now to an analysis of black electoral behavior in 
Atlanta during this period of disfranchisement. 
First, the potential political power of the black community in 
Atlanta must be assessed. To do so, this discussion will focus on 
population and voter registration data and socioeconomic status indi¬ 
cators. In 1910, Atlanta's black population comprised about forty 
^McKissack, "Attitudes," pp. 65-67. 
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percent (40%) of its total population. In the census years following, 
the city’s black population is recorded at about one-third of the total 
population (see Table One). This trend continued through the period of 
disfranchisement. 
Voter registration figures for these years are scarce and some¬ 
times not easily verifiable. Yet, it is possible to get some idea of 
the voting potential of the black population from data available in the 
literature. One source stated that toward the beginning of this period 
of disfranchisement, in 1908, of a potential l6,66l black voters only 
30 
1,500 were registered. Previously discussed figures reveal that 
registration fluctuated from raised levels in 1929 and 1932—special 
election years in which blacks voted heavily—to a low of 1,500 in 1935» 
Not until 1940 are well documented figures available again regarding 
registered voters. Only 2,015 blacks were recorded as registered in 
that year. Considering the fact that the black voting-age population 
stood at 67,908, only a tiny percentage of voting-age blacks were 
registered (see Table Two). This is characteristic of the disfran¬ 
chisement years. Further, in 1945, approximately 3>000 blacks were 
registered. This figure represented only four percent () of all 
registered voters, a figure far too low to include all voting-age 
blacks. 
The 1946 special Congressional election boosted black regis¬ 
tration figures by February to total 6,876 or 8.3 percent of the popu¬ 
lation registered to vote. At the conclusion of the All-Citizens 
Registration Committee campaign in May 1946, 21,244 blacks had 
■^Bacote, "Atlanta Politics," p. 341. 
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Whites as Per¬ 




Blacks as Per¬ 
cent of Total 
Population 
1900 89,872 54,145 60.2 35,727 39.8 
1910 154,839 102,937 66.5 51,902 33.5 
1920 200,616 137,820 68.7 62,796 31.3 
1930 270,366 180,291 66.7 90,075 33-3 
1940 302,288 197,686 65.4 104,533 34.6 
1950 331,314 209,898 63.4 121,285 36.6 
I960 487,455 300,635 61.7 186,464 38.3 
1970 496,973 240,503 48.7 255,051 51.3 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census. 
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TABLE 2 
VOTING AGE POPULATION IN ATLANTA BY RAGE 






Whites as Per¬ 




Blacks as Per¬ 
cent of Total 
Population 
1940 202,762 131,958 65.1 67,908 34.9 
1950 225,481 146,992 65.2 78,489 34.8 
I960 302,564 197,381 65.2 105,183 34.8 
1970 306,175 166,788 54.8 138,330 45.2 
SOURCE: Office of the Registrar, Fulton County. 
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registered to vote, representing 27.2 percent of the voting-age popula¬ 
tion registered to vote (see Table Three). It is clear from these data 
that throughout the period of disfranchisement in Georgia, few black 
Atlantans—as a percentage of those eligible—were registered to vote. 
Obstacles to registration included the barriers contained in the 1908 
constitutional amendment, the poll tax, and in the apathy engendered 
by blacks' inability to vote in primary elections where policy-making 
elected officials were chosen. Thus, the potential power of blacks at 
the ballot box was minimal during the decades of disfranchisement in 
Georgia. 
There were no blacks holding elective office from the turn of 
the century through 1946. Although two blacks ran for office in 1934— 
one for the Board of Aldermen and the other for the Board of Education— 
neither was elected in spite of receiving the support of the two voter 
leagues and the overwhelming majority of black votes in their own 
wards. Thus, black office-holding as a source of potential political 
power is neither a significant nor a viable indicator during this 
period. 
Furthermore, it is important to review socioeconomic charac¬ 
teristics of Atlanta's black population in assessing its potential 
political power. Education is considered a factor in socioeconomic 
status either because of the direct influence education might have in 
the political arena or, most probably, because of the income-earning 
potential it might command. From 1900 through 1930, education was 
measured by the Census Bureau in terms of illiteracy which was defined 
as the inability to write in any language. As shown in Table Four, 
more than one-third of Atlanta's black population was illiterate at the 
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TABLE 3 
BLACK REGISTERED VOTERS IN ATLANTA 
FULTON COUNTY PORTION 
Blacks Registered Percent of 







1945 3,000 4.0 
1946 (February) 6,876 8.3 
After Supreme Court Ruling against White Primary in Georgia: 
1946 (June) 21,244 27.2 
1952 22,300 25.8 
1956 23,4^0 27.0 
1958 27,440 25-3 
I960 34,393 29.5 
1961 41,469 28.6 
1962 44,846 31.5 
1963 43,722 31.5 
1964 59,084 34.0 
1965 57,068 34.5 
1966 63,807 36.0 
1967 64,390 36.8 
1968 75,361 38.0 
1969 81,354 40.7 
1970 87,541 41.7 
SOURCE: Augustus Alven Adair, "A Political History of the 
Negro in Atlanta 1908-1953" (Master's thesis, Atlanta University, 
1955); 0- A. Bacote, "The Negro in Atlanta Politics," Phylon 16 (Fourth 
Quarter 1955)* Rosetta Sangster McKissack, "Attitudes Toward Negro 
Political Participation in Georgia, 1940-1947" (Master's thesis, 
Atlanta University, 1954); Office of the Registrar, Fulton County. 
*This figure is the total for Fulton County; the figure for 
Atlanta only was not availahle. 
TABLE 4 
EDUCATION AMONG THE ATLANTA POPULATION BY MEASURE OF ILLITERACY* 
1900-1930 
Year 






















1900 NA NA NA 35.1 
1910 NA 8.6 NA NA 
1920 11,031 6.6 1,339 1.2 9,465 17.8 
1930 9,283 4.1 1,478** 0.98** 7,801 10.4 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census. 
illiteracy was defined in the Census as the inability to write in any language. 
**These figures include those persons designated as native white and foreign-horn white. 
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■beginning of the century. By the 1940 census, education was measured 
in school years completed. Black Atlanta's median education in that 
year was 5«9 years, not quite the complete equivalent of a primary 
school education (see Table Five). From both tables it is clear that 
black Atlantans never were as well educated as the white population of 
the city. 
Economic status is measured by income. Unfortunately, the data 
regarding income are not available by race for Atlanta prior to the 
1950 census. However, because black median income has never been less 
than forty-seven (47) percent of white income in any census in which it 
was recorded, it is reasonable to assume that the median income of 
black Atlantans always has been substantially less than that of the 
white population (see Table Six). Furthermore, a review of black 
occupations reveals that, prior to 1940, blacks engaged in professional 
and managerial occupations comprised only 4.3 percent of the black 
labor force. Again, it appears reasonable to assume that the numbers 
of blacks engaged in such higher status occupations prior to 1940 did 
not exceed the levels in that year. 
Given these factors, the socioeconomic characteristics of the 
black population in Atlanta reveal that it was—as a whole—at a rela¬ 
tive disadvantage to the white population. Thus, if there is a direct 
relationship between affluence and political power—the ability to 
influence the political process—then, blacks had a considerably smaller 
degree of influence in the decision-making process than white Atlantans. 
This powerlessness is compounded when the legislated barriers—the poll 
tax, grandfather clause, white primary and other restrictions—to black 
electoral participation are considered. Given that blacks comprised at 
TABLE 5 
YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED FOR NON-WHITE POPULATION OF ATLANTA AND 
MEDIAN SCHOOL YEARS COMPLETED FOR PERSONS 25 YEARS AND OLDER 
1940-1970 
Year None 1-4 5-8 
Years of School Completed 
High School College 






1940 3,776 18,308 26,346 4,898 2,611 1,724 1,211 5.9 8.6 
6.4$ 30.8$ 44.3$ 8.2$ 4.4$ 2.Ç$ 2.0$ 
1950 3,615 17,955 27,180 9,210 5,415 2,765 2,330 6.8 9.5 
5.1% 25.6$ 38.7% 13.1% 7.7% 3-S$ 3.3% 
I960 3,847 18,616 33,425 18,423 12,330 3,833 3,613 7.9 10.5 
3-7% 19.8$ 35.5% 19.6$ 13.1% 4.1$ 3-8$ 





2.8$ 11.7% 26.7$ 24.7$ 21.5% 5.9% 6.7% 9.6 10.7 
SOURCE! U.S. Bureau of the Census. 
♦These figures are for Atlanta in Fulton and DeKalb Counties. No median figures were given for 
the city as a whole. The top figure is for Atlanta in Fulton County; the bottom figure is for Atlanta in 
DeKalb County. The figure in parentheses is the average median for Atlanta in both counties. 
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TABLE 6 
BLACK FAMILY INCOME AND MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME 
1950-1970 
Number and Percent of Black Families 
1950 I960 1970 
Family Income N % N % N % 
$0-1,999 NA 10,435 25.5 7,460 13.1 
$2,000-3,999 NA 16,712 40.8 9,068 15.9 
$4,000-5,999 NA 8,092 19.8 10,004 17.6 
$6,000-7,999 NA 3,251 7.9 8,883 15.6 
$8,000-9,999 NA 1,435 3-5 7,421 13.0 
$10,000 and over NA 1,046 2.5 14,102 24.8 
Median Income 
for Total 
Population $2,664 $6,042 $8,399 
Median Black 




SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census. 
*Family income for Blacks was not reported in the 1950 Census. 
**Median income for Atlanta's non-white population was divided 
hy county. The top figure is for Atlanta in Fulton County; the Bottom 
figure is for Atlanta in DeKalb County. The figure in parentheses is 
the average of these two. 
least one-third of Atlanta's population between 1900 and 19^6» the 
black community had a potentially strong power base. However, because 
of limited voter registration and participation, lack of black elected 
officials, and relatively low socioeconomic status, black Atlantans 
did not maximize the potential power of their community during the 
years of disfranchisement. 
The inability to exercise the vote was a major obstacle in 
maximizing the potential power of blacks in Atlanta. Unable to elect 
public officials disposed to protect or foster the interests of their 
community, blacks could neither obtain substantial benefits, prevent 
the adoption of public policies inimical to their interests, nor ensure 
that the needs of the community were met. The vote, then, although the 
only leverage available to blacks, was severely restricted and, thus, 
of little utility in efforts to use it as an instrument of exchange. 
In a review of the nature of black political behavior in 
Atlanta during this period, it is important to consider the nature of 
the leadership of the community. Atlanta's black leadership appears to 
emerge from the major civic, educational, religious, social and social 
service organizations in the black community. The roster of affilia¬ 
tions includes black churches, businesses, schools, fraternities and 
other social organizations, and service organizations such as the 
NAACP, Urban League and the Butler Street "Y." Some black leaders were 
active participants in the major political parties, such as Benjamin 
Davis, John Wesley Dobbs, and W. J. Shaw with the Republican Party, and 
A. T. Walden and Warren Cochrane with the Democrats. It seems that 
such party activists emerged as leaders aside from their party affili¬ 
ations, not because of them. 
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Black leadership is identified primarily by its efforts to 
organize the black electorate. Contact with the white power structure 
appears to have been limited; so, it can be assumed that the leader¬ 
ship was not appointed or designated by whites. Malcolm Suber, in his 
Master's Thesis study entitled "The Internal Black Politics of Atlanta, 
Georgia 1944 to 1969," suggests that some blacks "announced" their 
leadership, setting themselves up as leaders, rather than emerging as 
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leaders at the behest of the community. As a modification of this 
notion, it is assumed here that leadership status came with organiza¬ 
tional position. In reviewing the organizations and institutions which 
spearheaded electoral efforts, the leadership of these organizations 
emerge as the political leadership of the times. In the cases of pri¬ 
marily social organizations, the leaders were chosen by the membership. 
For example, John Wesley Dobbs was elected Grand Master of the Prince 
Hall Masons. On the other hand, leaders that emerge from other organi¬ 
zations or institutions were not selected by a membership representa¬ 
tive of the larger black community, such as those from the black college 
campuses, businesses, the Urban League or the Butler Street "Y." 
Therefore, the conclusion is that black political leadership initially 
emerged from the community's organizational leadership and further 
solidified its leadership status through activism primarily designed 
to maximize the black vote. 
The function performed by black political leaders in Atlanta 
was development of the black vote for use in special elections or in 
the event that the white primary would be declared unconstitutional. 
■^Suber, "Internal Black Politics," p. 54. 
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Because the black electorate was not organized, there was not—in most 
cases—a bloc of votes with which black leaders could negotiate with 
the power structure for benefits. One exception to this is the 1921 
school bond referendum which initially suffered two defeats with the 
aid of black voters. Subsequent to a meeting between black leaders— 
who were not identified—and the white mayor and school board president 
in which the black community was promised tangible benefits—a portion 
of the bond issue for improvement of black schools—the measure passed 
with the overwhelming support of black voters. In other elections, 
however, although blacks voted for candidates least opposed to the 
community's interests, there is no evidence indicating that black 
leaders negotiated the exchange of black electoral support for any 
benefits from these candidates. Black leaders appear to have directed 
their efforts toward developing that vote so that later it could be 
used in the exchange process. 
Another element pertinent to black political behavior is 
organizational development. As the reader will recall, three organiza¬ 
tions emerged in the 1930s: the Atlanta Civic and Political League 
(1934), the Colored Voters League (1934), and the Citizens Democratic 
Club of Fulton County (1937)• Included in the purpose of the ACPL was 
the acquisition of improvements in the quality of life in the black 
community "through the use of the ballot." The other organizations' 
purposes were the same although their target population or party 
preference was different. The literature indicates that these groups, 
particularly the Atlanta Civic and Political League, focused their 
energies on maximizing and organizing the black vote. As Dr. C. A. 
Bacote acknowledges, in the article "The Negro in Atlanta Politics," 
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the groups and the leadership were not successful in registering the 
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masses of black Atlantans until 1946. 
What becomes clear in a review of the period is that black 
leaders and organizations had little in the way of benefits to offer 
blacks in exchange for their vote or for their membership in an organi¬ 
zation. Purposive rewards, such as the feeling that their efforts 
advanced the struggle of black people, were virtually the only benefit 
black leaders or groups could offer the community. Tangible or 
material benefits were unavailable because the white power structure 
was not disposed to offer such as long as the black vote was not criti¬ 
cal to its maintenance of power. 
In spite of this, some elements of exchange did exist in this 
situation. First, there was a large potential black electorate. 
Secondly, the black electorate was in need of, according to socio¬ 
economic indicators, material or welfare benefits. Further, an element 
of exchange noted by Murray and Vedlitz in their discussion of exchange 
theory—a lack of communication between the black electorate and the 
white power structure—existed, presenting the leadership an opportunity 
to develop a link for communication and, thus, an exchange pattern. 
The obstacle to the development of a clear-cut exchange pattern, then, 
appears to be in the "legal" barriers to black voting. The element of 
leverage which the black community could use for exchange—the vote— 
was not organized or even available to blacks in circumstances where it 
most effectively could be used—the primary election. 
Thus, at the close of the period of disfranchisement in Georgia, 
^^Bacote, "Atlanta Politics," p. 346. 
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in 1946, black Atlanta had significant potential power but lacked the 
ability to use the vote in an exchange process to maximize that power. 
Once the barriers to black voting were dismantled, black Atlantans did 
register to vote, but the vote remained unorganized initially and not 
fully developed (only twenty-seven percent (27%) of blacks in Atlanta 
registered in 1946). The stage of political development in terms of 
exchange, then, conforms to the expectations postulated in exchange 
theory: that the black electorate had difficulty organizing because 
of its lack of resources (and large size) and, further, that voter 
organizations were unable to unite the black electorate in order to 
secure benefits or to maximize its political power. 
CHAPTER III 
POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AND POLITICAL EXCHANGE 
This chapter will review "black political activity in Atlanta 
from 19^6 up to 1969. The year 19^ ushered in a new era of black 
political history in Atlanta, for in this year legal barriers to black 
voting were dismantled. Black voters began participating in the elec¬ 
toral life of the city in significant numbers for the first time in the 
twentieth century. Before recounting the events which mark that his¬ 
tory, however, it is necessary to assess the potential political power 
of Atlanta's black community during this period. 
The first factor of importance in this assessment involves 
population statistics. In 19^0 blacks comprised one-third of Atlanta's 
total population. By 1950» this proportion grew to thirty-six percent 
(36%) and by I960 the black portion of Atlanta's population was thirty- 
eight percent (38%). This last figure slightly under-represents the 
growth of the black population because during this decade some outlying 
areas were annexed to Atlanta adding white residents—and voters—to the 
city's population. The 1970 census numbers Atlanta’s population at 
nearly one-half of one million with blacks constituting a majority— 
fifty-one percent (51%)—for the first time (Table One). 
For the first two (2) decades of this period—19^0 through 
I960—the black voting age population was about thirty-five percent 




until 1970 did blacks show gains in potential voting power. In that 
year, although comprising a majority of the general population, blacks 
made up a minority of those eligible to vote—forty-five percent (45%)— 
while whites retained a voting majority comprising fifty-five percent 
{55%) the voting age population (Table Two). 
More important in an assessment of potential political power, 
however, are voter registration figures. One can see from Table Three 
that in 1940 the two thousand blacks registered to vote comprised a 
miniscule portion of Atlanta's voting population. The critical year 
during this decade is 1946. Prior to that year's Supreme Court deci¬ 
sion outlawing state legislated barriers to black voting, black 
registered voters made up only eight percent (8%) of Atlanta's voting 
population. A massive voter registration drive launched after this 
ruling increased the numbers of black voters in the city from 6,876 to 
21,244 or twenty-seven percent (27%) of registered voters. The data 
for black voter registration in 1952 reflect that year's annexation 
effects. The percent of black registered voters dropped to twenty-five 
(25) even though the number had increased to 22,300. In i960 voter 
registration figures reflect some growth in the proportion of Atlanta's 
black registered voters; they accounted for thirty percent (30%) of 
registered voters. For the mayoral elections of 1961 and 1965» the 
number of black voters registered jumped from 41,469 to 57>068, an 
increase from twenty-eight percent (28%) to thirty-four percent (3^%) 
of registered voters. Toward the end of this period, though constitut¬ 
ing a population majority, registered black voters were numbered at 
81,354 or forty percent (40%) of those registered in Atlanta. 
Statistics revealing socioeconomic characteristics of Atlanta's 
53 
black population are considered to be indicative of its potential power 
because it appears that more affluent people tend to have dispropor¬ 
tionate influence within the political process. In 1940, blacks' edu¬ 
cational attainment—measured in median school years completed—lagged 
more than two (2) years behind that of whites and remained so until 
1970 when the difference in school years completed was about one and 
one-half (Table Five). It should be pointed out that in 1940 eighty 
percent (80%) of black Atlantans had not attained a primary school edu¬ 
cation and by 1970 sixty-five percent (65%) of blacks had not completed 
high school. Comparatively, black Atlantans' educational levels never 
equalled those of the white population during this period. 
A significant indicator of economic status is income. In 1950» 
the first year figures are available, although black family income was 
not reported, the median black family income was $1,427 compared to the 
total population's median income of $2,664—a level measuring little 
more than half of the income of families in the general population 
(Table Six). By i960, family income more than doubled but for the black 
family dropped relative to median family income for the total popula¬ 
tion. In that year black family income in Atlanta was $3» 108, only 
fifty-one percent (51%) of median family income for Atlanta's total 
population ($6,042). In 1970 black earnings made significant gains, 
measuring nearly eighty percent (80%) of median family income for the 
total population. In order to keep these figures in perspective, it 
must be remembered that in i960 eighty-five percent (85%) of black 
Atlanta families earned less than $6,000 and by 1970 sixty percent 
(60%) of these families still earned incomes below that figure. Thus, 
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the overwhelming majority of Atlanta's Hack families had relatively 
low income levels. 
A further indicator of socioeconomic status is occupation. 
Table Seven reveals that in the census years 1940, 1950 and i960 more 
than one-half of Atlanta's employed blacks worked as laborers, service 
and household workers. During these decades, barely six percent (6%) 
of blacks worked at professional and managerial occupations. By 1970 
more blacks had moved into higher status occupations as skilled workers. 
Still, forty percent (40%) of employed blacks worked as unskilled 
laborers while at the other end of the occupational status scale eleven 
percent (11%) of blacks held professional jobs. 
Finally, one factor which comes into play for the first time 
during this period must be noted. Black office-holding contributes to 
the potential political power of black Atlantans. For the first time 
in this century, there was one black person elected to the nine (9) 
member Board of Education in 1953» Although black candidates sought 
election to the City's Board of Aldermen for several years, it was not 
until 1965 that a black person was elected to that eighteen (18) member 
body. In county government (Fulton County, in which the majority of 
Atlanta lies) no blacks held elective office. It was not until the 
early 1960s that blacks were elected to the state legislature—mentioned 
here because they were elected from Atlanta districts although they 
served in elective offices at the state government level. 
In assessing the potential political power of blacks in 
Atlanta, population statistics indicate that blacks have comprised, 
since 1940, a significant portion of the general population as well as 
of the voting age population, thus constituting a potentially powerful 
TABLE 7 
OCCUPATIONS OF BLACKS IN ATLANTA l6 YEARS AND OLDER 
1940-1970 
Number and Percent of Blacks Employed in Each Category 
1940 1950 I960 1970 
Occupation N % N % N % N % 
Professional and 
Managerial 1,954 4.3 2,929 5.6 3,971 5.7 11,308 11.4 
Sales and Clerical 1,243 2.8 2,675 5.1 4,699 6.8 18,983 19.1 
Craftsmen and 
Operatives 9,655 21.5 13,755 26.2 17,396 25.2 30,528 30.8 
Laborers, S ervic e 
Workers and 
Household Workers 31,837 71.0 32,610 62.0 38,002 55.0 38,564 38.8 
Total Employed 44,879 52,552 69,049 99,383 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census. 
force. The significance of the population size increases as Atlanta's 
black population grows approaching the end of the period under study. 
Unfortunately, blacks have not maximized this potential as reflected in 
voter registration data. These show that although able to cast thirty- 
five percent (35%) of the votes in Atlanta through the 1940s and 1950s, 
blacks did not register to vote at that level until the mid-1960s (by 
which time the potential probably had increased). Even so, registra¬ 
tion figures for blacks reflected significant potential black voting 
power. 
On the other hand, income, educational and occupational charac¬ 
teristics reveal that black Atlantans have been socioeconomically sub¬ 
ordinate to the white population, possessing little affluence and, 
thus, having had a considerably smaller degree of influence, deriving 
from these factors, in the political process. Finally, the relative 
dearth of black elected officials and their minority position vis-a-vis 
the size of the legislative, consensus-run bodies to which they 
belonged minimized the effectiveness of black office-holding on the 
potential political power of blacks in Atlanta. 
Given all these factors, it can be concluded that black poten¬ 
tial political power in the city during this period had an increasing 
significance. More than any other indicators, potential voting 
strength contributed to this potential for influence in the political 
process while socioeconomic conditions reduced it. No doubt, however, 
there was significant potential for blacks to exercise political power 
from 1946 up through the 1960s. The history of this period will reveal 
the extent to which this potential was translated into actual power. 
The year 1946 ushered in a new political era for the black 
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citizens of Atlanta. Blacks registered to vote in such numbers— 
following that year's Supreme Court invalidation of Georgia's white 
primary—that they held a potential twenty-seven percent (27%) of the 
city's votes. For the first time blacks could have a significant bar¬ 
gaining position in city elections—if the black vote had been orga¬ 
nized. In fact, it is reported that the Republican-oriented Atlanta 
Civic and Political League clashed with Black Democrats during the 19^8 
election for Fulton County Solicitor."*" 
These two groupings, Democrat and Republican, represented the 
organizational division in the black community. In an effort to main¬ 
tain and unify the black vote, black Republicans, under the leadership 
of John Wesley Dobbs, and black Democrats, under the direction of 
A. T. Walden, joined together to form the Atlanta Negro Voters League 
in 1949. The League was a membership organization designed to register 
blacks to vote and to endorse candidates, thus, providing a strengthened 
and organized black vote in local elections. 
This year also marked the nascent emergence of an interracial 
coalition which successfully supported mayoral candidates through two 
decades of elections. Black voters, under the leadership of the 
Atlanta Negro Voters League, along with white voters from Atlanta's 
affluent north side supported William B. Hartsfield in his 19^9 re- 
election bid for mayor. That Democratic primary—which still was the 
vehicle that produced the city's elected officials—was the first in 
which white candidates no longer risked political suicide by openly 
seeking black votes. White candidates began to appear at meetings and 
"*"John H. Calhoun, "Significant Aspects of Some Negro Leaders' 
Contributions to the Progress of Atlanta, Georgia" (Master's thesis, 
Atlanta University, 1968), p. 93- 
58 
rallies in wards with large numbers of black voters soliciting their 
support. City leaders also recognized the strength of the black vote 
which provided the margin of victory to Hartsfield in the mayoral elec¬ 
tions of 19^9, 1953 and 1957.2 
The Atlanta Negro Voters League (ANVL) provided the leadership 
that is credited for organizing the black vote in these elections. 
Black voters generally supported League-endorsed candidates at the 
polls to the extent that the ANVL was recognized as the vehicle for 
3 
soliciting the black vote. A review of the League's activities will 
demonstrate its effectiveness throughout the decade of the 1950s. 
The purpose of the Atlanta Negro Voters League was to organize 
Atlanta's black voters. In discussing the purpose of the League, 
C. A. Bacote suggests that in the organization of black voters, the 
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strength of the black vote would be maximized. Thus, early efforts 
by the ANVL included registering more blacks to vote. The All-Citizens 
Registration Committee, which had registered almost 18,000 black voters 
in 1946, operated under the auspices of the ANVL in order to accomplish 
this task. A primary purpose of the Atlanta Negro Voters League was 
to unify the black community in supporting "the most desirable" candi¬ 
dates in local elections. Members were free to vote for any candidate 
of their choice in national elections but were expected to vote for 
League-endorsed candidates in city and county elections. 
The endorsement of candidates was a major function of the ANVL; 
2Ibid., p. 95. 
3 
Interview with John H. Calhoun, October 17, 1978. 
4 
Interview with C. A. Bacote, Ph.D., Chairman, Department of 
History, Atlanta University, March 29» 1976. 
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in order to do this, a Screening Committee was formed consisting pri¬ 
marily of the group's Executive Committee. These officers, committee 
chairpersons, ward and precinct leaders along with "pastors and other 
civic leaders" would hear the presentations of candidates invited to 
speak and would question them on critical issues. A secret "ballot 
would be taken in committee a few days before the election and the 
results made known to a group of officers who then would prepare a 
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"ticket" of recommendations by the League. Tens of thousands of 
copies of the "ticket" bearing instructions on the use of voting 
machines, the name of the organization and the signatures of its chair¬ 
man would be distributed throughout the black community. 
The ANVL succeeded in its efforts to turn out the black vote 
in the municipal elections of 19^9» 1953 and 1957 and those voters 
supported, in overwhelming numbers, League-endorsed candidates at the 
polls. As a result, the ANVL developed the reputation for being able 
to "deliver" black votes, a factor which hastened its recognition by 
the white power structure in Atlanta. 
League membership was open to individuals as well as organiza¬ 
tions in the black community but was "comprised mainly of (community) 
leaders" in the estimate of Dr. Robert Brisbane, Chairman of the 
Morehouse College Department of Political Science.^ The leadership of 
the ANVL included John Wesley Dobbs and A. T. Walden, its first co- 
chairmen, as well as others active in the business and political life 
of the black community including Warren Cochrane, director of the 
5 
Calhoun, "Negro Leaders' Contributions," pp. 99-100. 
^Interview with Robert Brisbane, Ph.D., Chairman, Department of 
Political Science, Morehouse College, March 26, 1976. 
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Butler Street YMCA; C. A. Scott, editor of the "black daily newspaper; 
W. J. Shaw, secretary in the Republican party organization; J. R. 
Henderson, manager of a public housing project; Walter H. Aiken, con¬ 
tractor; John Calhoun, businessman; C. R. Yates, operator of a drug 
store chain; high school principal, Professor C. L. Harper; Reverend 
Martin Luther King, Sr., pastor of Ebenezer Baptist Church; director 
of the Atlanta Urban League, Grace T. Hamilton; and others including 
J. C. Long, J. D. Whitaker, R. A. Thompson, Charles Greenlea, 
V. W. Hodges, and W. S. Holloman. 
The leadership of the ANVL remained in the hands of a small 
group, limiting the ability for young aspiring politicos to rise 
within the organization. Membership, however, remained sufficiently 
open so that most community leaders could feel as if they "had a part 
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in determining how blacks would vote." Furthermore, most of the 
leadership of the League held leadership positions in other institu¬ 
tions, from political organizations to social and civic groups as well 
as schools and churches. They comprised, therefore, the leadership of 
black Atlanta's institutional as well as political life. 
The Atlanta Negro Voters League operated to register blacks to 
vote, educate those voters and get them to the polls on election day to 
vote for candidates screened by community leaders and selected as "the 
g 
lesser of two evils." It was important that the ANVL support those 
candidates that were perceived by blacks as responsible to—or 
7 
Malcolm Suber, "The Internal Black Politics of Atlanta, 
Georgia 1944 to 1969: An Analytic Study of Black Political Leadership 
and Organization" (Master's thesis, Atlanta University, 1975)» p. 62. 
0 
Interview with Brisbane. 
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minimally, least opposed to—the interests of Hack Atlantans. Evi¬ 
dently, through the 1950s the League succeeded in this effort because 
black voters continued to support League choices, indicating that it 
retained a significant degree of trust from the black community. 
Able to "deliver" black votes, the Atlanta Negro Voters League 
was recognized as a political force to be reckoned with by elements 
within the white power structure, particularly elected officials. This 
recognition enabled the black leadership of the ANVL to maintain com¬ 
munications with the city's leadership. As a result of black acknowl¬ 
edgement of and trust in its leadership, its access to white leader¬ 
ship, its ability to command a significant portion of the city's votes, 
the Atlanta Negro Voters League became the link between the black com¬ 
munity and the white power structure, a clearinghouse for black prob¬ 
lems. 
This raises the question about the existence and nature of the 
exchange process accompanying the activities of the Voters League. 
From a review of the literature and from interviews with persons having 
knowledge of this period of black political activity, it can be assumed 
that the black political leadership made requests that were implicit 
suggestions for benefits rather than explicit demands. In the "screen¬ 
ing" process, where candidates for public office responded to the ques¬ 
tions of the ANVL Screening Committee members, electoral support was 
implied in exchange for attention to concerns expressed by the black 
9 
leadership in those sessions. Although the elements of exchange were 
alluded to rather than made explicit, this in no way alters the 
9 
Interview with Calhoun. 
62 
character of the exchange process. The participants in the inter¬ 
change knew clearly that the votes of Hack citizens were brokered, by 
the Atlanta Negro Voters League in exchange for benefits to be 
delivered by white elected officials. 
Direct demands appear to have been put to city officials. In 
this case, the League leadership requested benefits of Mayor 
Hartsfield's administration. Hartsfield already had received the crit¬ 
ical support of black voters in the 19^9 city election. No doubt, the 
implication of future votes was implied in the requests for city atten¬ 
tion to black community needs. 
Benefits accruing to the black community during this period 
include new and improved facilities such as lights, streets, garbage 
collection, sidewalks and school buildings. Blacks were hired as 
policemen and police brutality against blacks was reduced. Treatment 
of black citizens by city officials was improved while discriminatory 
courtroom behavior and treatment were minimized. A less tangible 
benefit lay in the fact that by defeating staunch segregationists at 
the polls, black voters kept "racial moderates" in office and, thus, 
"committed the city's leadership to moderation. 
Asked whether individual black leaders received anything spe¬ 
cifically beneficial, persons interviewed did not denote that any 
leader received something in exchange for black support. However, the 
probability that individual benefits may have accrued to several 
leaders was not discounted. 
■^Harry Holloway, The Politics of the Southern Negro; From 
Exclusion to Big City Organization (New York: Random House, 1969), 
p. 201. 
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The question of whether the Atlanta Negro Voters League 
received any direct benefits was addressed by John Calhoun, a political 
leader of several years experience in Atlanta. In his thesis discuss¬ 
ing black leaders' contributions to Atlanta's progress, Calhoun 
recounts the process whereby the ANVL treasurer would "suggest confi¬ 
dentially" a contribution from candidates appearing before the Screen¬ 
ing Committee. The transaction took place so that only the treasurer 
knew how much money each candidate contributed to pay "for expenses." 
Calhoun adds that: 
the amount of money has nothing to do with the recommenda¬ 
tions . . . Although the charges of 'vote buying' and 'fraud' 
have been made, none have been proven and after the 1961 elec¬ 
tion, the Fulton County Grand Jury investigated but gave the 
League a clean bill of health.^ 
The benefits derived from the exchange brokered by the Atlanta 
Negro Voters League were significant gains and of importance to the 
black community. However, these benefits for the most part, did not 
accrue to the vast majority of Atlanta's black population. The masses 
12 
of poor blacks benefited little from these concessions. Further, it 
must be pointed out that in spite of black voter registration and 
organization, segregation remained intact, a fact which overshadows the 
benefits achieved. 
Even so, the Atlanta Negro Voters League was without viable 
competition from 19*1-9 until the 1960s. The West Side Voters League 
was organized in 19*1-9 by J. C. Long, the ANVL's Republican co-vice¬ 
chairman who resigned after an altercation with co-chairman Dobbs. 
■'‘^Calhoun, "Negro Leaders' Contributions," p. 100. 
'''^Holloway, Politics of the Southern Negro, p. 202. 
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This group is reported to have been composed of west side leaders, who 
"resisted the influence of the 'Auburn Avenue' politicians" and never 
13 
developed the grass roots organization which characterized the ANVL. 
Another group organized outside of the ANVL was the South Atlanta Civic 
League started by L. D. Simon purportedly "in protest against the 
neglect" of Atlanta's south side. Calhoun goes on to report that other 
organizations emerged during this period but none has "prevailed 
14 
against the campaigns of the Atlanta Negro Voters League." Brisbane 
further characterizes these splinter groups as narrowly focused on 
15 
neighborhood issues. At any rate, none successfully challenged the 
leadership of ANVL. 
A review of the activities and operation of the League must 
conclude that the organization was effective in meeting its goals of 
registering blacks to vote, turning out the black vote on election day, 
"delivering" the vote to endorsed candidates, and securing benefits for 
the black community. There is no doubt that the ANVL served as the 
channel for communications and for benefits between the white power 
structure and the black community. At the same time, however, the 
League did not incorporate channels for sustained contact with the bulk 
of black voters, thereby losing input from the masses of black 
Atlantans. The leadership of the League was small and remained rela¬ 
tively closed, allowing no opportunity for the development of new, 
young leadership. 
13 
Calhoun, "Negro Leaders' Contributions," pp. 97-98. 
14 
Ibid., p. 100. 
^Interview with Brisbane. 
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Finally, the League appears to have succeeded in establishing 
black voters as a significant political force in city politics but did 
not maximize black political power to an extent that elevated blacks 
from "second class citizenship." As noted above, the Atlanta Negro 
Voters League did secure some benefits but these were selective and 
did not affect the masses of black voters. Secondly, a measure of 
black political power is its ability to prevent policy inimical to the 
interests of the community. The fact alone that segregation remained 
intact suggests failure in this regard. Finally, it is clear that no 
black agenda—items of interest to the welfare of the black community— 
was developed or included in the policy-making process. Rather, issues 
appear to have emerged in an ad hoc fashion with no systematic input 
from the community and no design for improving qualitatively the wel¬ 
fare of Atlanta's black citizens. 
The Atlanta Negro Voters League, despite its weaknesses and 
significant but limited successes, was a critical force in the political 
development of black Atlantans. It served important functions, par¬ 
ticularly in organizing the black vote to develop its strength. Per¬ 
haps the limitations of its successes caught up with the League and were 
made more prominent by the emergence of the Civil Rights Movement, its 
new leadership style and demands. The activities of the Civil Rights 
Movement in Atlanta in the early 1960s caused a disruption in black 
leadership and the emergence of a new leadership group within the black 
community. It is important to turn to a discussion of the 1960s and 
their attendant changes in black political history in Atlanta. 
On February 1, I960, black students held the first sit-in at a 
lunch counter in Greensboro, North Carolina. Within one week, similar 
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groups were sitting down, refusing to leave in protest of segregated 
facilities across the South. In response to this movement and in 
anticipation of its spread to Georgia, the state's legislature enacted 
an anti-trespass law on February 17, I960. 
On March 15, I960 seventy-seven (77) students were arrested 
for demonstrating in the first sit-in in Atlanta. From this action, 
protest escalated to include picket lines, mass meetings and a march on 
the state capitol. After summer vacation, sit-ins resumed in October 
when large numbers of students were arrested once again. This time the 
students refused to leave on bail and, with the city jail fast becoming 
overcrowded, Mayor Hartsfield called for a thirty (30) day truce during 
which he hoped to reach a settlement. 
It is important to understand that the participants in the 
movement at this point were by far young black men and women, many of 
them students. In part, their frustration with "what seemed to them to 
be acquiescence to the status quo on the part of the established Negro 
leaders""^ motivated them to direct action. Disagreements over tactics 
as well as other issues fostered mutual distrust and recriminations 
17 
between the "young turks" and the "old guard." 
Such discord contributed to the failure of several attempts to 
negotiate a settlement. The established, conservative black leaders 
were hard pressed to work out an agreement between the young demon¬ 
strators and the white downtown businessmen. Thus, the efforts to 
1^Jack L. Walker, "Protest and Negotiation: A Case Study of 
Negro Leadership in Atlanta, Georgia," Midwest Journal of Political 
Science 7 (May 1963), p. 102. 
17 Ibid., pp. 104-05. 
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negotiate a settlement during the "truce" in the fall of i960 proved 
unsuccessful. 
Students resumed demonstrations in November and organized a 
boycott of downtown stores as well. For three months the sit-ins con¬ 
tinued without incident. However, on February 7» 196l, students were 
arrested at one lunch counter and for three days arrests continued. 
Again, students refused to leave the city jail. 
At that time, tension was at a fever pitch and there was a 
general fear that violence soon might erupt. Student leaders 
approached an established black leader who successfully started nego- 
l8 
tiations that resulted in a proposed settlement. That settlement was 
accepted by both sides in the spring of 1961. It called for desegrega¬ 
tion of lunch counters after the completion of school desegregation 
slated for fall of that year. Lunch counter desegregation actually 
occurred in Atlanta on September 27, 1961. 
These events marked the emergence of the Civil Rights Movement 
in Atlanta. For the first time, black demands could not be negotiated 
through the established black leadership. Communication between the 
white power structure and the black community were unsuccessful and 
there existed competing leadership groups within Atlanta's black com¬ 
munity . 
This was the first substantial challenge to the traditional 
black leadership and especially to the unilateral leadership of the 
l8 
The established black leader referred to here was not iden¬ 
tified in the source material from which this account largely is drawn; 
Walker, "Protest and Negotiation," pp. 99-124. A subsequent review of 
Mr. Walker's references failed to disclose the identity of the leader 
in question. 
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Atlanta Negro Voters League. The civil rights demonstrations empha¬ 
sized the weaknesses of this leadership. First, the support of demon¬ 
strators by the community exposed the resentment of the limited, indi¬ 
vidualized benefits gained by the League leadership and its failure to 
secure concessions beneficial to the entire community. It delineated 
the frustration of the masses of blacks with gains wrested within a 
continuing structure of segregation and inequality. Secondly, the con¬ 
frontation of the student leadership exemplified the inadequacies of 
the old leadership style. League leaders were accustomed to negotiat¬ 
ing with whites amenable to black requests, making unobtrusive appeals 
for material benefits whose concession would not threaten the existing 
structure of black-white relationships, and working in ways acceptable 
to the white leadership. The third weakness pointed out by the chal¬ 
lenge of new leadership was the old leadership's closed circle that 
frustrated the attempts of younger men to attain leadership positions 
within the organization and within the community. Young politicos 
worked and allied themselves with the Civil Rights Movement in Atlanta. 
They emerged as a new leadership group that owed no allegiance to the 
Atlanta Negro Voters League. Some of them forged new organizations 
which were basically civil rights groups that did not challenge the 
electoral leadership of the ANVL. One of these was the Atlanta Commit¬ 
tee for Cooperative Action formed in i960 by younger business and pro¬ 
fessional men. Another was the Committee on Appeal for Human Rights, 
19 
a student organization set up in i960. 7
The most powerful new group to emerge, however, was the Atlanta 
19 7Suber, "Internal Black Politics," p. 73» and Walker, "Protest 
and Negotiation," p. 105. 
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Summit Leadership Conference (ASLC) proposed in 1963 to address the 
problems of the black community. All community, civic, religious and 
civil rights organizations were invited to participate and the ASLC 
idea was endorsed by organizations including the ANVL, the NAACP (whose 
leadership had become more militant in recent years), the Student Non- 
Violent Coordinating Committee and the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference (both more nationally than locally oriented groups), the 
Atlanta Committee for Cooperative Action and the Committee on Appeal 
for Human Rights. 
The organizing meeting of the Conference, called by newly- 
elected State Senator Leroy Johnson and Atlanta Life Insurance Executive 
Jesse Hill, was held in October 1963 where the goal to desegregate all 
20 
of Atlanta's public facilities was set. It was decided that a steer¬ 
ing committee of fifteen (15) members would provide the ASLC leader¬ 
ship. This committee would include one (l) representative of each 
sponsoring group with the remainder of the members elected at large. 
The steering committee was charged with the responsibility of designing 
a plan to address and solve community problems in the areas of public 
accommodations, voter registration, education and school desegregation, 
21 
employment, health, housing, law and politics. Co-chairmen were 
elected. One represented new leaderships Clarence Coleman. The other 
was a member of the city's established black leadership: A. T. Walden. 
The Atlanta Summit Leadership Conference appears to have been a 
"tactical alliance" between an old leadership trying to retain its 
20 
Atlanta Journal and Constitution, October 20, 1963. 
21 
Atlanta Daily World, October 20, 1963. p. 1. 
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power within the "black community and an emergent leadership trying to 
secure power within the community without causing an open rift. Suber 
suggests that the absence of stated methods by which to pursue its 
22 
goals was evidence of the ASLG's effort not to disrupt the community. 
A newspaper account of the group's beginnings suggests further that the 
ASLG did not seek to "usurp the authority" of any other group, thus 
avoiding destruction of the old leadership's organization, the Atlanta 
23 
Negro Voters League. 
The Atlanta Summit Leadership Conference was considered the 
most powerful black organization in Atlanta from its inception in 1963 
through the late 1960s. It provided the leadership of local efforts to 
desegregate facilities throughout the city. While it served as a 
vehicle for the development of a new leadership group, it did not 
replace the electoral functions of the Atlanta Negro Voters League. In 
fact, some of the young leaders in ASLG still helped the ANVL put out a 
24 
"ticket" at election time. 
The emergence of the Summit Leadership Conference as the polit¬ 
ical broker for the black community did dislodge the Atlanta Negro 
Voters League as the clearinghouse for black problems. Other factors 
directly related to the League's leadership displacement included a 
25 26 
partisan split within its ranks; D the emergence of nationalism; but, 
pp 
Suber, "Internal Black Politics," p. 82. 
^Atlanta Daily World, October 20, 1963. 
24 
Interview with Leroy Johnson, October 19, 1978. 
25 
Interview with Robert Brisbane. 
26 
Interview with G. A. Bacote. 
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most especially, the death, in 1964, of A. T. Walden, a founder, leader 
and cornerstone of its existence. 
Thus, the early 1960s decade witnessed the emergence of a new 
organization encompassing Atlanta’s new black leadership. But the 
Atlanta Summit Leadership Conference was an organization designed to 
include the community's leaders, not voters like the Atlanta Negro 
Voters League. There appears also to have been little evidence of the 
formalized exchange process of the past. Demands were made, conces¬ 
sions were negotiated and direct action, more than the black vote, 
appears to have been the method as well as the medium of exchange in 
these negotiations. That is not to suggest that the voting strength of 
the black community was not used. Rather, the black vote was no longer 
the sole medium of exchange. Black leadership had available other 
sanctions in its direct action tactics. 
The new leadership differed also in the fact that it no longer 
strived to present a unified front. The leadership operated in an 
"informal consortium of elected and appointed leaders" serving as the 
27 
political broker in the black community. Within this informal struc¬ 
ture, however, there was competition among leaders attempting to emerge 
28 
as "individual political brokers." The men identified as the ascen¬ 
dant political leaders of this new group include, most prominently, 
then-State Senator Leroy Johnson and business executive Jesse Hill. 
Both men were groomed in the Voters League but emerged as leaders in 
their own right as a result of their activities in the Civil Rights 
27 
'Suber, "Internal Black Politics," p. 89. 
28 
Ibid., p. 83; and Interview with Leroy Johnson. 
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Movement in Atlanta. Hill, along with contractor Herman Russell, put 
up the capital to transform the student-devised flier reporting civil 
rights demonstrations into the Atlanta Inquirer newspaper. It has been 
suggested that after these two men solidified their leadership posi¬ 
tion, they "began promoting social worker types" including Lyndon Wade, 
director of the Atlanta Urban League; John Cox, head of the Butler 
Street "Y"; and realtor and later Alderman, Q. V. Williamson. These 
members of the "power elite" were reported to have been joined by local 
NAACP president, Lonnie King; new financial leaders: Charles Reynolds, 
president of the black Citizens Trust Bank; and Fletcher Coombs, his 
29 
counterpart at the black Mutual Federal Savings and Loan. Among all 
these, most observers agree that Senator Johnson was the leader and 
most powerful member of the group. 
As a final point in the discussion of the new leadership group 
and its vehicle, the Atlanta Summit Leadership Conference, it is impor¬ 
tant to note its efforts toward maximizing black political power. 
First, the group was able to acquire benefits from the city's leader¬ 
ship structure in the form of desegregation of facilities. While 
upgrading the status of black Atlantans, the fact remains that these 
benefits did not alter the subordinate position—relative to the posi¬ 
tion and power of the white community—of the city's black citizens. 
Policy decisions still were made within the priorities demanded by this 
structure. Finally the fact that this organization's leadership, after 
30 
the direct action campaigns, functioned on an "issue by issue" basis, 
29 
Peter Ross Range, "Making It in Atlanta: Capitol of Black-Is- 
Beautiful," New York Times Magazine, 7 April 197^, P- 7*K 
30 
Interview with David Franklin. 
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indicated a reactive style lacking an agenda of items for pursuit in 
meeting the needs of the black community. 
No discussion of the years from 19^9 to 1969 would be complete 
without a review of Atlanta's much-touted interracial coalition of 
voters that prevailed in the election of Atlanta's mayors from 19^9 to 
1965. In 19^9» the first city election following the invalidation of 
Georgia's white primary, black voters provided the margin of victory 
allowing incumbent Mayor William B. Hartsfield to remain in office. In 
that election, black voters joined with affluent northside whites to 
support the more racially moderate Hartsfield. Since then, these two 
groups of voters have successfully supported the winning candidates at 
the polls in the mayoral elections of 1953» 1957» 196l and 1965. 
Black votes in the coalition were organized and solicited by 
the Atlanta Negro Voters League whose leadership entered into this 
partnership in order to prevent staunch segregationists from being 
elected to city posts. White leadership in the coalition consisted of 
the city's business and commercial elite as well as their political 
functionaries aware that a winning coalition could sustain their power 
and allow them to pursue their policies. This leadership is considered 
to have developed the support of Atlanta's upper and middle income white 
residents whose interests they appear to share; thus, the white power 
structure merged its votes with the black vote to develop the winning 
coalition. 
In his analysis of this coalition, Harry Holloway suggests 
several factors pre-disposing these groups to form a coalition. They 
are: that the black leadership was moderate and middle class; early 
black demands for exchange were minimal; white business leaders had 
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contempt for poor whites and preferred to deal with educated blacks; 
white leaders were eager to sustain their power; and that middle and 
upper class whites tended to be more tolerant and less devoted to 
31 
segregationist policies than poor whites. 
It is agreed that black leadership during that time was 
moderate, perhaps even conservative and hardly inclined to demand con¬ 
cessions of the white power structure which would alter the relation¬ 
ship between the black and white communities. This moderation on the 
part of the black leadership made the coalition more comfortable for 
the white leadership because it was unlikely to risk white voter dis¬ 
pleasure by conceding to "unreasonable" black demands. On the other 
hand, rather than offer white elite contempt of poor whites, white 
upper class tolerance or decreased need for segregation, it seems more 
likely that the interests of sustaining their own power would be suf¬ 
ficient to dispose white leadership toward coalition formation. 
The coalition, in its early years, was paternalistic in 
character: whites set the conditions and objectives and then merely 
expected black support. Within this arrangement, both white and black 
observers have noted that black leaders demanded little in exchange for 
black votes, taking the role of "junior," "silent" partners. Even 
Mayor Ivan Allen characterized black involvement in the coalition as 
such: 
For nearly two decades the black community had been a silent 
partner in the election of city officials in Atlanta, 
generally going along with whatever moderate candidate the 
business and civic fathers endorsed.32 
■^^Holloway, Politics of the Southern Negro, p. 196. 
32 
Ivan Allen, Mayor; Notes on the Sixties (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1971)» p. 222. 
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In this manner, black voters participated in a coalition to 
re-elect Mayor Hartsfield in 19^9• 1953 and 1957* It appears that even 
though black leadership changed hands in the 1960s, there was little 
change in the style of participation by black voters in the city's 
interracial coalition. Black support for Ivan Allen's mayoral candi¬ 
dacy in 1961 and 1965 was expected and received. 
A statistical study of black and white—both northside and 
other—voting patterns concludes that the black-white coalition exists, 
if at all, only in races for mayor and for these is not statistically 
33 
verifiable because there have been so few of them. The critical 
point to be made here is that although blacks voted for white candi¬ 
dates—even over black candidates in some campaigns—the white community, 
including white coalition members, failed to provide large amounts of 
support for black candidates. Given that all city posts, including 
ward representation on the Boards of Aldermen and Education, had to be 
voted on city-wide, black voters lacked the numerical strength to elect 
candidates without white support. 
In all too few city elections during this period did a black 
candidate receive sufficiently large amounts of white votes to defeat 
his white opponent; Dr. Rufus Clement, president of Atlanta University 
and a Voters League candidate, defeated the white incumbent Board of 
Education Third Ward representative in 1953* Clement was re-elected in 
1957. In 1957 and 1961, the Atlanta Negro Voters League ran blacks in 
races for Board of Alderman posts. T. M. Alexander was defeated in a 
^•^Berdie Ricks Hardon, "A Statistical Analysis of the Black- 
White Voting Coalition in Atlanta 19^9-1970" (Master's thesis, Georgia 
State University, 1972), p. x. 
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run-off against the white candidate, Jack Summers, in 1957* Again in 
1961, the ANVL candidate, Q. V. Williams, failed to receive enough 
white support to he elected. However, in the 1965 election Williamson 
maximized his black support and garnered enough white votes to become 
the first black man elected to the Board of Aldermen. 
Finally, it appears that the benefits derived from black par¬ 
ticipation in this coalition were extremely limited. During Mayor Ivan 
Allen's administration, blacks received more visible, tangible rewards. 
Some jobs in city government were opened to blacks in addition to the 
fact that black policemen were allowed to arrest whites for the first 
time and that school desegregation supposedly was begun. The quality 
of benefits derived from black coalition participation varied little 
from that of other kinds of black political behavior during the 1960s. 
In summary, the years from 19^6 to 1969 were marked by the 
emergence of two black leadership groupings having different organiza¬ 
tional bases, styles and goals. The first organization nurtured the 
slow but steady development of the black electorate while other factors 
affecting maximization of black political power—population and voter 
registration growth, socioeconomic characteristics—barely improved. 
Given these conditions, an exchange process was forged through which 
limited benefits were received. Despite this, maximization of black 
political power barely was initiated. 
The second leadership group emerged during a period of more 
rapid growth and progress toward improved socioeconomic conditions. 
With new emphasis on goals and methods, different benefits were 
garnered. While these improved the status of black Atlantans, they did 
not alter the superordinate-subordinate structure of racial 
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relationships. Black political power, though strengthened., was not 
maximized sufficiently to meet the needs and solve the problems of 
inequity for the black community. 
Throughout this period, accompanying these organizational and 
leadership changes, an interracial voting coalition existed which did 
little more than exploit the black vote without providing commensurate 
benefits. 
In applying the analysis of exchange theory, it is clear that 
the anticipated difficulty of potential black voters to organize 
occurred from 19^6 until 19^9. However, with the offer of increased 
voter strength and subsequent potential benefits, a black organization 
based on exchange emerged as the Atlanta Negro Voters League. Reward 
incentives—primarily material benefits trickling down from city 
government—came from outside the organization. Solidary benefits 
derived from group association and leadership status. Purposive bene¬ 
fits accrued from white recognition of the ANVL and solicitation of its 
support. As long as the ANVL served as the clearinghouse for black 
problems and broker for the black vote, its leadership prevailed. 
Though not identified specifically, it has been suggested that the 
group's entrepreneurs—its leadership—received individual material 
benefits sufficient to pay for their organizing initiative. At the 
same time, the benefit incentives for black voter participation 
remained largely collective—new and better facilities—and purposive— 
moderate, as opposed to rabidly racist, white elected officials. Pre¬ 
dictably, whites did not control sufficient resources to distribute 
selective benefits through the black community. Even if they had, 
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heavy sanctions would have been imposed if white elites had made too 
many concessions to blacks. 
The exchange theory's phase three, in which black voters reach 
a level of sophistication where they no longer need organization- 
provided cues or when a substantial number of candidates arrive who 
communicate directly with black voters, still had not developed in 
Atlanta's political environment. Despite this, there was a breakdown 
in the exchange structure established by the Atlanta Negro Voters 
League. This writer suggests that the breakdown of the League's 
dominance occurred because: l) the ANVL lost control of communications 
between demonstrators and the white leadership; 2) black voters, who 
supported the demands of the Civil Rights Movement, were no longer 
satisfied with the limited benefits offered by the League; 3) new 
leaders, with their own organizational operations, were better able to 
negotiate between the black masses and the leadership structure; and 
4) these new leaders made available sanctions—specifically direct 
action: boycotts, sit-ins, and demonstrations—beyond the scope of the 
old leadership style of the ANVL. 
As a result, the new black leadership group assumed the entre¬ 
preneurial role in the exchange process. Though the goals and methods 
of the exchange pattern were escalated to meet the increased expecta¬ 
tions of the black masses, the need—or at the least, the desire—for 
organization-provided cues remained and candidates did not undertake to 
communicate directly with black voters. Avenues of communications 
increased, especially with the publication of the Atlanta Inquirer and 
with the expansion of the mass media, eliminating the need for "ticket" 
mass distribution; but, the cues still were given and followed by black 
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voters. Therefore, the organizational development of black political 
activity in Atlanta advanced; yet, the conditions for exchange remained 
qualitatively unaltered. 
CHAPTER 4 
BLACK POLITICAL POWER MATURES? 
As the decade of the 1970s approached Atlanta—unlike many- 
northern cities beset by declining population, decreasing revenues, 
racial polarization and insidious decay—enjoyed a period of prosperity 
and growth heralded across the nation. Atlanta's population increased 
from i960 to 1970. Although there was a decrease in the city's white 
population, the white business and commercial elite continued to invest 
in and build on to the central business district to the extent that 
Atlanta nearly bypassed the recessive slump of the early 1970s. Having 
desegregated its facilities in the 1960s relatively early and having 
avoided the community-rending rebellions of that decade, Atlanta 
reveled in her reputation for harmonious race relations."*" 
The black community experienced growth also, for its population 
increased by more than 68,000 raising the proportion of Atlanta's black 
population to fifty-one percent (51%) of the total by 1970 (see Table 
One). Despite this majority, blacks comprised only forty-five percent 
(45%) of those eligible to vote and a minority—forty-one percent (4l%) — 
of those registered in 1970. By the time of the 1973 election blacks 
remained, though barely, a minority of registered voters comprising 
See Douglass Cater, "Atlanta: Smart Politics and Good Race 
Relations," Reporter, 11 July 1957» PP* 18-21; Claude Sitton, 
"Atlanta's Example: Good Sense and Dignity," New York Times Magazine, 
6 May 1962, p. 22; Peter Ross Range, "Making It in Atlanta: Capital of 
Black-Is-Beautiful," New York Times Magazine, 7 April 1974, p. 28. 
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forty-nine percent (49%) of the registrants (see Tables Two and Three). 
Recalling the earlier discussion of socioeconomic status, it is 
clear that black Atlantans shared neither educational levels nor income 
parity with whites. Closer examination will reveal, however, that dur¬ 
ing the I960 decade those gaps were reduced markedly. In i960, the 
median school years completed by blacks was two and one-half years less 
than that of whites. By 1970, this gap was reduced to one and one-half 
years, the largest gain since such census measurements were recorded 
first in 19^0 (see Table Five). Reported family income levels reveal 
that while more than eighty-five percent (85%) of black families earned 
incomes less than $6,000 in i960, that proportion of low income 
families was reduced to forty-six percent (46%) by 1970. Black median 
family income was barely one-half of the total population's median 
income in i960. While the total population's median income increased 
by forty percent (40%) from i960 to 1970, median black family income 
more than doubled. Yet it still averaged only three-fourths that of 
all Atlanta families (see Table Six). 
Another socioeconomic indicator reveals more about the status 
of blacks. In I960, more than eighty percent (80%) of the 69,0^9 black 
workers over 16 years old were employed in semi-skilled and unskilled 
occupations, the bulk—fifty-five percent (55%)—working as laborers, 
service and household workers. In ten years, though the number of 
blacks employed increased to almost 100,000, the proportion of blacks 
in lower status jobs decreased to sixty-eight percent (68%)—still a 
distressingly high figure. At the other end of the occupational spec¬ 
trum, the proportion of blacks employed in professional and managerial 
jobs ranged from six percent (6%) in i960 to eleven percent (ll%) in 
82 
1970, the largest growth occurring up to then (see Table Seven). While 
the period shows progress, there is an important factor that colors its 
implications. Unemployment levels for blacks were more than double 
those of whites. In 1970, the unemployment rate for white Atlantans 
2 
was 3.4 percent but for black workers was 7-3 percent. 
A review of black-owned businesses reveals even more about 
affluence among black Atlantans. This factor is important because it 
is the economic elite—black and white—that is said to exercise dis¬ 
proportionate influence in Atlanta politics. In his analysis of black 
political empowerment in the city, Mack Jones concludes that Atlanta's 
black business sector, in 1972, appeared prosperous compared to that of 
3 
other cities. Yet, in perspective, black business nationally earned a 
miniscule one-third of one percent of the income of all U.S. firms. 
Jones states that: 
the most telling statistic is the fact that only 4,222 per¬ 
sons (other than the self-employed) are employed by black 
firms in Atlanta. This is not the most auspicious base 
upon which to build political power.^ 
From this review of socioeconomic characteristics, it can be 
concluded that although the I960 to 1970 decade witnessed a greater 
increase in several status indicators for blacks than for whites, black 
Atlantans did not share the relative affluence of the white population 
in 1970. If, as some suggest, political power accompanies affluence, 
^Research Atlanta, Which Way Atlanta? (Atlanta: Atlanta 
Research, Inc., 1973)» p. 44. 
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then it must be concluded that black Atlantans had considerably less 
influence over the policy-making process than whites. This holds true 
for black business persons as well. 
Finally, a source of empowerment for blacks lay in the influ¬ 
ence of black officeholders. On the eve of the 1969 elections, there 
were three black elected officials holding city positions: one aider- 
man and two Atlanta school board members. As stated before, their 
number—relative to the size of the consensus-run bodies to which they 
belonged—limited the ability of these black officeholders to influ¬ 
ence the decision-making process in Atlanta politics. 
An assessment of potential political power among blacks at the 
dawn of the 1970s must stress, in light of the foregoing data, the fact 
that blacks in 1969 comprised a critical voting minority in city poli¬ 
tics and in 1973 shared, almost equally, voting potential with whites. 
Clearly, population majority and electorate size were the black com¬ 
munity's strongest assets in its efforts to develop political power. 
The 1970s offered a new opportunity to maximize black political power 
in Atlanta. The events of this period will reveal the success of these 
efforts. 
As the 1969 elections approached, Mayor Ivan Allen declined a 
bid for re-election and later, as head of the white leadership struc¬ 
ture, endorsed white alderman Rodney Cook for mayor. Black leaders 
refused to support Cook, rejecting—for the first time in the twenty 
year alliance of the coalition—the white power structure's dictate. 
This rupture seriously disturbed Atlanta's white leaders for there was 
wide acknowledgement of the potential strength of the black vote. 
Black leaders, aware of this potential power, still doubted the ability 
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of a black candidate to be elected mayor or vice-mayor. They were con¬ 
fident, on the other hand, that a number of blacks could secure seats 
on the Board of Aldermen in the next election. In spite of the rejec¬ 
tion of the white power structure's candidate, the strategy of the 
black leadership continued to rest in a coalition with white voters to 
elect a white mayor. 
This brokering of the black vote persisted despite the absence 
of an organizational structure in the black community. Since the 
demise of the Atlanta Negro Voters League in the early 1960s, there had 
been no effective efforts to register and organize black voters, to 
develop policy items in the interests of the black community, or sys¬ 
tematically to elect officials committed to implementing such policy 
alternatives. 
Attempts to develop political power were limited to a "static" 
coalition of black business and civic leaders with the few black 
elected officials and, on the other hand, the city's white power struc¬ 
ture, consisting of the business and commercial elite together with its 
elected operatives. 
State Senator Leroy Johnson dominated the black leadership 
group at that point, and it was believed that he was the most likely 
black candidate for mayor or vice-mayor. While Johnson hesitated, a 
political newcomer, Maynard Jackson announced that he was entering the 
race for vice-mayor. Jackson was not completely new to Atlanta's 
political scene; he had run for a U.S. Senate seat against incumbent 
Herman Talmadge in 1968. In that race, Jackson lost but, most impor¬ 
tantly, carried the city with 6,000 votes. This was done without the 
approval or support of Atlanta's black leadership. Shortly after 
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Jackson's announcement, Horace Tate, the black associate director of 
the Georgia Association of Educators entered the race for mayor. These 
two early candidates thus usurped the initiative of black office holders 
considering candidacies in these races.^ 
As for leadership endorsement, support for Tate from the white 
power structure was out of the question. Black leaders thought he 
would divide the black vote.^ So, they gave their support to Sam 
Massell, a Jewish realtor who had served as vice-mayor during the eight 
years of Ivan Allen's administration. The black leadership group felt 
that by electing Massell with a majority of black votes he would be 
"beholden" to the black community. 
Jackson, on the other hand, had angered black leaders by enter¬ 
ing the campaign without first consulting them. He had no organiza¬ 
tional base in the community. Most black leaders were certain Jackson 
could not be elected vice-mayor especially in light of the fact that 
blacks comprised only forty percent (k0%) of the registered voters. 
The only other major contender in that race was Alderman Milton Farris, 
the white power structure's candidate for vice-mayor. Jackson recounts 
that the black leadership was divided over his candidacy. Many did not 
support him but did not oppose his candidacy and, thus, "were effec- 
7 
tively neutralized." 
In the October 7th general election for mayor, Sam Massell 
received 31 percent of the votes cast; Cook received 26.9 percent; and 
c. 
Interview with David Franklin, 23 October 1978. 
^Interview with Leroy Johnson, 19 October 1978. 
7 
Interview with Mayor Maynard Jackson, 10 March 1975- 
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Tate won 22.9 percent. The "black vote was split almost evenly: Tate 
received 49 percent and Massell 44.2 percent. White voters cast their 
"ballots for white candidates almost exclusively, giving them to the 
more "acceptable" aspirants, Cook and Everett Millican, a conservative 
"law and order" candidate. A small portion—only 21 percent—of the 
white electorate cast their ballots for Massell. Northside voters, the 
black electorate's traditional coalition ally in mayoral elections, 
gave a majority of their support to Cook and only 22 percent of their 
Q 
votes to blacks' favored white candidate, Massell. In the October 21st 
run-off election, Massell won with 55 percent of the vote. Massell 
became mayor with the overwhelming majority of black votes—92.2 per¬ 
cent; he received only 27 percent of the white votes. Northside whites 
o 
cast only 25.8 percent of their ballots for Massell. 
Atlanta voters elected Maynard Jackson vice-mayor in the 
October 7th general election—without a run-off. Jackson garnered 58.2 
percent of the total vote, with 97.8 percent black support. His total 
white support added up to 15,000 votes or 27-7 percent; one-third of 
northside voters supported Jackson. Black voters summarily trounced 
the white power structure's candidate. 
In both the mayoral and vice-mayoral elections black voters 
determined the outcome. The turnout of black voters was higher than 
white voters' turnout in each of these elections. The strength of the 
g 
Charles S. Rooks, The Atlanta Elections of 1969 (Atlanta: 
Voter Education Project, Inc., 1970), p. 13. 
9Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
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black vote has been attributed to its solidarity and to the higher rates 
of participation by blacks. 
In the campaigns for aldermanic posts, twenty black candidates 
sought election to the eighteen seats decided in city-wide contests. 
Black membership increased from one to five in this election. Of the 
four newcomers, three defeated white candidates with the support of 
12 
large black majorities and some whites. This same combination of 
voters elected three blacks to the Board of Education; two newly-elected 
13 
winners defeated white candidates. 
Charles Rooks, in an analysis of the 1969 elections, points out 
that in more than half of these twenty-nine campaigns the majority of 
white voters opposed the majority of black voters. Further, white 
voters were less likely to cast substantial numbers of ballots for 
14 
black candidates than vice versa. This reflects one conclusion of a 
statistical analysis of several elections: that the white electorate 
has failed to provide large amounts of support to black candidates.^ 
The results of the 1969 municipal elections were significant 
for several reasons. First, the number of black elected officials 
increased to nine. Secondly, the black community played a decisive 
role in the outcomes of several races including the top two. Blacks 
11Ibid., pp. 31-32. 
12Ibid., p. 43. 
13Ibid., p. 52. 
14 
Ibid., pp. 58-63. 
"^Berdie Ricks Hardon, "A Statistical Analysis of the Black- 
White Voting Coalition in Atlanta 1949-1970" (Master's thesis, Georgia 
State University, 1972), p. 18. 
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effectively had elected Atlanta's mayor and vice-mayor in 1969, a 
fact—especially in the case of the mayor—not to he forgotten in the 
ensuing four years. 
Finally, and most importantly, these elections had a substan¬ 
tial impact on Atlanta's coalition and its black leadership especially. 
Massell's victory signalled the rupture of the black-white voting coa¬ 
lition which had selected the city's mayors since 19^9- Blacks clearly 
rejected the candidate endorsed by the city's white power structure. 
The break was not complete, however, because black voters—on the 
whole—failed to support the black candidate instead. Moreover, in the 
general election for mayor and in the election for vice-mayor to a 
lesser extent, a substantial number of black voters did not follow the 
cues of the black leadership. Almost half of black voters cast ballots 
for Horace Tate, a candidate rejected by black leaders attempting to 
broker the community's vote. In the vice-mayoral race, the black elec¬ 
torate again rejected the white leadership designee and voted for 
Maynard Jackson, a candidate not supported meaningfully by black 
leaders. All in all, the 1969 elections provided a greater oppor¬ 
tunity—through more black elected officials and through an increas¬ 
ingly stronger and more independent black vote—for maximizing black 
political power in Atlanta. 
In the ensuing years, those blacks elected to city government 
offices manifested no efforts to develop a platform of issues to be 
addressed in order to meet the needs and solve the problems of the 
black community. While no black agenda was pursued, neither did black 
elected officials succeed in altering the existing priorities of 
policy-making—priorities which, in and of themselves, precluded the 
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solution of fundamental problems faced by black Atlantans. Rather, the 
efforts of black officeholders were limited to securing an equitable 
share of benefits and services within established priorities. 
Efforts by black aldermen illustrate these attempts. The Board 
of Aldermen, under Atlanta's weak mayor-strong council form of govern¬ 
ment, was divided into committees which monitored the operations of 
departments within city government. Committee membership was deter¬ 
mined by mayoral appointment. In addition, the mayor and vice-mayor 
were ex officio members of all committees. Since the vice-mayor par¬ 
ticipated in committees—and the mayor did not—the vice-mayor became, 
in effect, "a de facto permanent voting member of every committee."^ 
In the first year of his administration, Mayor Massell 
appointed at least one black to each of the fifteen aldermanic commit¬ 
tees. Ten of these committees consisted of only three members, permit¬ 
ting blacks, with the black vice-mayor's participation, to deadlock a 
committee vote or, in the event of a split vote between white aldermen, 
to determine a policy. 
Black aldermen used this leverage to attack racial discrimina¬ 
tion in a number of city departments. Segregation of facilities in the 
Water Department was eradicated by the efforts of the vice-mayor and 
the black alderman on the committee overseeing that department. Subse¬ 
quently, discrimination in the department was revealed in a report com¬ 
missioned by black officials and prepared by the city's race-relations 
agency. Again, discrimination was the focus of concern in the Police 
and Fire Departments. Black Alderman H. D. Dodson ordered Fire 
16 
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Department administrators to eradicate discrimination and double the 
number of black firemen. Another black alderman chaired the Police 
Committee which logged complaints of discrimination by black policemen. 
In response, the vice-mayor exhorted city administrators to "prove" the 
17 
absence of discrimination in their departments or "face firing." 
Black officeholders hardly were successful, however, in placing blacks 
in administrative positions that might have improved employment pros¬ 
pects for blacks who primarily comprised the lowest ranks of city 
l8 
employees. Furthermore, black aldermen attempted to secure a more 
equitable share of benefits for blacks, working to ensure that blacks 
received city contracts, that contractors were equal opportunity 
employers, that programs operated without discrimination—guaranteeing, 
for the most part, that black constituents received "a piece of the 
pie." 
Such efforts were met with stiff opposition, especially from 
the mayor. When time came for aldermanic committee re-appointments the 
following year, Massell shuffled assignments so that four critical 
committees—finance; legislation, planning and development; ordinance; 
and zoning—had no black members. Further, the size of these bodies 
was changed to eliminate the possibility of black dominance. 
Other actions by Massell provide evidence that he honored no 
debt to the black community, despite the importance of its vote in his 
election. In 1971» for example, Massell made a speech to the Hungry 
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whites from Atlanta. He argued that "blacks were obliged to "make the 
city more attractive" so that whites would stay and, further, urged 
19 
that blacks "think white." In December of that year, Massell 
announced that he planned to have introduced to the state General Assem¬ 
bly legislation designed to annex outlying areas to the city's boun¬ 
daries. This move would include about 50»000 whites who would be eli¬ 
gible to vote in the 1973 elections. The mayor argued that his plan 
was not racially motivated, but the telling fact was that almost half 
20 
of his speech addressed the racial implications of the proposal. The 
annexation legislation never passed the legislature, but not because of 
the efforts of black elected officials. In his capacity as presiding 
officer in the State Senate, Lieutenant Governor Lester Maddox, a 
blatant segregationist refused to call the proposal from the calendar. 
The measure died there. 
On other issues, Massell opposed the interests of blacks. When 
in 1970 sanitation workers—most of whom were black—went on strike for 
improved pay and benefits, the Mayor resisted their demands. In fact, 
he secured passage of legislation eliminating the dues check-off privi¬ 
lege of the strikers' union. Massell and vice-mayor Jackson divided 
21 
sharply over this issue when Jackson publicly supported the workers. 
As late as September 1973» Massell ignored black citizens' con¬ 
cerns. Following several questionable police shootings of blacks and 
charges of brutality, the mayor continued to defend Police Chief John 
19 
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Inman. Inman, having taken a "law and order" attitude, presided over a 
force which had killed thirteen blacks in a nine month period. Massell 
not only defended Inman hut walked out of a meeting with blacks who had 
22 
protested the brutalization of a fifteen year old girl. 
During his tenure as mayor, Massell sought to strengthen his 
support in the white community, disregarding and often opposing the 
interests of black Atlantans. The mayor surmised that he would not 
have their vote in 1973 anyway. A black candidate—probably Jackson— 
was expected to oppose him and to receive the bulk of black votes. 
The city's white business and commercial elite, on the other 
hand, developed a different relationship with blacks. In pursuing its 
policy initiatives, the power structure maintained a "coalition" of 
sorts. It functioned not so much to operationalize black political 
power but to garner the support of black leadership to insure its own 
objectives. Jones states that the politics of paternalism succumbed to 
the pressure of Atlanta's substantial black population. The old coali¬ 
tion style—in which policy was dictated by whites and support from 
23 
blacks expected—gave way to negotiation for black backing. 
The approval of a rapid transit system is a specific example of 
this alteration. A proposal to develop the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid 
Transit Authority (MARTA) was put to the voters in a 1968 referendum. 
It would have authorized the system with federal and local funding; the 
latter financed through an ad valorem property tax. The black 
22The Great Speckled Bird (Atlanta), 17 September 1973» p. 8; 
Atlanta Voice, 29 September 1973» P* 2. 
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community was not consulted in the process of developing this proposal. 
The measure was defeated with an overwhelming rejection by black 
voters. 
Before resubmission in 1970, a task force of blacks had nego¬ 
tiated for specific concessions to the community including a seven-year 
15 cents fare, a rail line linking a large and poor black neighborhood 
to the transportation system, and vigorous affirmative action goals for 
24 
hiring and contracting. The black task force, headed by Vice-Mayor 
Jackson and State Senator Johnson, in turn agreed to support the new 
financing plan which would rely on a sales tax increase. Such a tax is 
more regressive and strains already limited incomes, thus affecting 
masses of blacks. In spite of this, black leadership rallied the sup¬ 
port of the black community. Those not favoring the measure were 
characterized as "opposed to economic growth and civic progress." As 
one writer suggests: "Black politicians aspiring to higher office 
2*5 
could not afford such a label." The second MARTA referendum was 
passed with substantial black support. 
A second issue pursued by Atlanta's white leadership had more 
extensive implications. The adoption of a new city charter would 
change election procedures and redistrict the entire city; change the 
type of government procedure, altering the relationship of the mayor 
and council, and limiting council's administrative powers ; and give 
24 
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responsibility for reorganizing the city's administrative apparatus to 
the city officials elected in 1973» 
The charter function, of course, was the responsibility of the 
state legislature. Even so, legislation applying to a particular 
county must have the approval of state legislators representing that 
jurisdiction. Thus, the black members of the Fulton County delegation 
had to pass on the charter proposal. A charter commission was 
appointed, ten of whose twenty-six members were black. The vice- 
chairman also was black. 
Under the old charter, eighteen aldermen—though each resided 
in a specific district—were elected by a city-wide vote. Within this 
system, as the city's population became increasingly black, more black 
aldermen were elected. Projections of a majority-black population 
harbored the possibility that all aldermen elected at-large would be 
black. The new charter redistricted the city and provided for twelve 
single-member districts with six at-large positions for council persons 
elected from paired districts. The projection for a 1973 election with 
whites still holding a small voting majority ensured the election of 
council persons from at least four majority-white districts and one at- 
large district. In this manner, whites were guaranteed minimal repre¬ 
sentation on the City Council. 
Another change in the charter converted the city to a "strong 
mayor" form of government from the previous system. Administrative 
oversight shifted from aldermanic committees to the mayor. This change 
significantly altered the ability of black aldermen to monitor opera¬ 
tions with respect to black interests. 
Further, the charter substituted the presidency of City Council 
95 
for the vice-mayoral position, an office which had held little substan¬ 
tive power. The City Council President was to have the responsibility 
of appointing council committees, supervising the newly-created council 
staff, conducting council meetings and exercising a tie-breaking vote 
there. The council presidency became city government's second most 
powerful position. 
Other charter revisions mandated a nine-member Board of Educa¬ 
tion with six single-member districts and three paired-district, at- 
large seats. Again, minimal white representation was assured, at least 
for the near future. The charter was signed into law in 1973 and 
slated to take effect with the 197^ inauguration of city officials 
chosen in the previous year's elections. 
Through these years there was no evidence of organizational 
development within Atlanta's black community. Certainly there was no 
group forged to organize or register black voters in order to maximize 
their electoral potential. One writer suggests that: "the opening of 
public offices (to blacks) accompanied the demise of general black 
political organizations." 
There had been some attempts by black leaders to organize, but 
these groups did not take in black voters on a community-wide basis. 
As mentioned earlier, the Atlanta Summit Leadership Conference (ASLC) 
was comprised mainly of the black leadership. This group, though instru¬ 
mental in desegregation, did not develop a black electoral organization. 
Instead, it negotiated with the city's white business and commercial 
Malcolm Suber, "The Internal Black Politics of Atlanta, 
Georgia 1944-1969: An Analytic Study of Black Political Leadership and 
Organization" (Master's thesis, Atlanta University, 1975)* P* 88. 
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leaders on an issue by issue basis. ASLC emerged in the early 1960s 
and functioned as late as 1970, presenting concerns about discrimina¬ 
tion in city government, but without benefit of the backing of black 
27 
voters. 
In 1971 « there was an organization formed which was designed as 
a federation of black community groups and individual leaders. The 
Atlanta Consortium, as it was called, divided into committees covering 
areas of concern such as education, employment, local government, etc. 
Each committee had the task of investigating its issue, then recommend¬ 
ing solutions to problems. The Consortium, however, appears to have 
made little progress toward developing as a mechanism to resolve the 
problems of Atlanta's black community. 
Finally, black leaders made another separate attempt to join 
with certain influential whites to address community-wide issues. This 
group of twelve whites and twelve blacks met as the Atlanta Action 
Forum and has been described as a "shadow cabinet that represents the 
28 
new integrated power structure of the city." The Action Forum func¬ 
tioned in the early 1970s in addition to any efforts by black leader¬ 
ship alone. It appears to have been a forum for negotiation but, 
again, seems not to have developed into an ongoing mechanism for prob¬ 
lem resolution between the white and black communities. Thus, by the 
eve of the 1973 elections, there had been no community-wide efforts to 
organize the black electorate. Black leaders formed structures but 
27 
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without the hacking of a systematically developed constituency of black 
voters. 
At this point, Atlanta's leadership was comprised of those 
influential blacks who had emerged during the early 1960s as well as a 
few black elected officials who had taken office in later years. They 
continued to negotiate with the white power structure on issues 
initiated by that structure. Black leaders functioned in a coalition 
in which whites continued to dictate the terms of issues within exist¬ 
ing priorities. Although in a few instances there were attempts by the 
black leadership to redress problems or to obtain a share of benefits, 
these efforts were not successful in altering either the superordinate- 
subordinate structure of power relationship between blacks and whites 
or the fundamental problems of the black community. The issue of a 
rapid transit system was the single instance of leverage of the black 
vote; the benefits realized from this were limited at best. The polit¬ 
ical power of black Atlantans had not been maximized, and their most 
potent weapon—the vote—was not used to wrest meaningful concessions 
to benefit the masses of blacks. 
The 1973 elections, however, presented an opportunity for 
blacks to flex their electoral muscle. Black voters comprised 4-9 per¬ 
cent of registered voters in 1973 even though only 59 percent of eli- 
29 
gible blacks were registered. There was a general assumption that a 
black mayor would be elected. 
Again without consulting the black leadership group, Maynard 
Jackson entered the race for mayor. This time he had the support of 
29 
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the black leadership. It is reported that when they presented Jackson's 
candidacy to white leaders in the Atlanta Action Forum, the white power 
structure balked, incensed that blacks would initiate an agenda item 
30 
and present it for their support. A number of white business and com¬ 
mercial elites did support Jackson, but their leadership was split. On 
the other hand, they did not support Massell, who was running for re- 
election. Some of them backed Charles Weltner, a white liberal who was 
a former U.S. Congressman. The white leadership structure, however, was 
unable to unite behind a single white candidate and, as a result, did 
not invest their resources in a cogent effort to prevent the election 
of a black mayor. 
The other significant black mayoral candidate was Leroy Johnson 
who, for years, had been considered one of the most powerful blacks in 
Atlanta politics. But Johnson's power was on the wane, superceded by 
Jesse Hill, considered foremost among the black leadership group at 
this time. The reasons for Johnson's candidacy may be several, includ¬ 
ing the fact that he doubted Jackson's ability to defeat Massell. Fur¬ 
ther, the mayor's office was considered the only powerful office left 
attainable by blacks. Perhaps, too, Johnson misjudged his strength. 
Or, as some suggest, he was encouraged by some whites to run in order 
to force Jackson into a run-off where—some thought—he could be 
defeated. In spite of Johnson's candidacy, black leaders supported 
Maynard Jackson for mayor. 
In the mayoral race, there appeared to be one quasi- 
organizational effort in the black community to unite. A mock election 
30 
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to select one black mayoral candidate was held at Atlanta University. 
Students, faculty and staff overwhelmingly supported Jackson. There 
was no effort, however, to organize black candidates to run as a team 
in several races, though the usual tickets were distributed in the 
black community. 
There appears to have been an effort to prevent the election of 
a black candidate in the vice-mayoral race. Reports that the black 
leadership organized to dissuade a serious black candidacy in this race 
have not been verified. Such rumors suggested that black leaders had 
agreed to support white vice-mayoral candidate Wade Mitchell, a banker 
and former alderman, in exchange for white support of Jackson. Maynard 
Jackson denies having participated in such a deal, although admitting 
it may have existed. 
At any rate, no serious black candidate had entered the race at 
that point. Angered by the rumors, Hosea Williams, a civil rights 
activist announced his candidacy for vice-mayor, intending to "bust the 
deal." He opposed Mitchell, the white power structure's candidate and 
Wyche Fowler, a less conservative white alderman. 
In the October 2nd general election, Maynard Jackson received 
47 percent of the votes cast; Massell received 20 percent; Weltner got 
31 
19 percent; and Leroy Johnson had just under 4 percent of the votes. 
In this race, Jackson received approximately 95 percent of votes cast 
by blacks and 17 percent of white votes. Massell's support came from 
82 percent of white voters and a tiny percentage of black voters. The 
most surprising result of this election was Leroy Johnson's low vote; 
31 
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3.8 percent—just enough to prevent Maynard Jackson from winning with¬ 
out a run-off. 
In the race for President of City Council, both the white and 
black leadership opposed Hosea Williams' candidacy. There was, more¬ 
over, an attitude that since Atlantans surely were to elect a black 
mayor, there should be a white vice-mayor, to "balance" the complexion 
of city government. However, black votes—Williams had virtually no 
white votes—put Williams in a run-off with Wyche Fowler. The vote 
totals were Fowler, 31 percent; Williams, 29 percent; and Mitchell, 
26 percent. Blacks gave about 40 percent of their votes to Fowler and 
a majority—51 percent—to Williams; a minimal number of black voters 
supported Mitchell who had been endorsed by black leaders. 
The campaign between the general election and the run-off elec¬ 
tion was turned into an obviously racist one by Sam Massell. Prior to 
the general election, race was not injected into campaign politics as 
a result of a "gentleman's agreement" among the candidates. However, 
with Massell facing Jackson in a run-off, the incumbent mayor played on 
white fears, campaigning as if Atlanta would be destroyed if it was 
governed by blacks. Massell focused his racial attacks on Jackson and 
Williams as a team but singled out Williams as a racist. He attempted 
to get more whites to vote than before, assuming they would vote for 
him. 
The Atlanta newspapers and elements in its business establish¬ 
ment appeared to be tacit, if not overt, supporters of this tactic. 
Advertisements stating that Atlanta was "too young to die" and admon¬ 
ishing white voters that it was "cheaper to vote than to move" appealed 
to white racist sentiment. The campaign was so blatant that the 
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newspapers reluctantly endorsed Jackson, whom they previously had sug¬ 
gested was racist during his tenure as vice-mayor. 
Massell's efforts to elicit the white vote appear to have back¬ 
fired. While white turnout increased from 45 to 55 percent, black 
turnout increased even more—from 55 to 66.8 percent. Jackson's white 
vote surged 14 points to 31 percent. Even without white support, 
Jackson received 54,867 votes from predominantly black districts to 
Massell's 51>237 total votes. Jackson won the run-off with 59 percent 
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of the vote to Massell's 4l percent. 
In the run-off election for President of City Council, Wyche 
Fowler won with 64 percent of the vote to Williams 36 percent. Though 
66 percent of blacks voted for Williams, Fowler increased his black 
support and won the race with black votes. Though blacks did not cast 
ballots for President of City Council in the same numbers as they voted 
for mayor, the white turnout did not make the expected drop—55>2 per¬ 
cent of white voters cast ballots in both top races. Whites thus 
determinedly made a point to vote against Hosea Williams. It was black 
voters however, who in voting for Fowler, made clear their intention to 
elect a racially balanced administration. 
Racial balance was the result of the City Council races as well. 
Nine blacks and an equal number of whites were elected to Council posts. 
However, in each of eleven council districts the elected candidate was 
of the same race as the majority of voters. Blacks were successful in 
only two city-wide council races despite the fact that seven districts 
were predominantly black. Further, in five interracial council races 
32 
'Ibid., p. 15. 
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no "blacks were elected. Voting was lower in Council races; blacks 
voted at lower levels than whites in council elections than in contests 
for mayor or vice-mayor. 
In elections for Board of Education posts, the results 
reflected the same voting patterns. In each of the six school board 
districts, the majority of voters elected a candidate of the same race. 
There were two contests with candidates of both races; one black suc¬ 
ceeded in these races. The total number of blacks elected to the Board 
of Education was five. 
The election results indicated clearly that voters generally 
cast ballots for a candidate of their own race. However, blacks sup¬ 
ported white candidates in greater numbers than whites supported black 
hopefuls. This contributed to the failure of blacks to elect more 
black officials, along with the lower turnout rates of blacks in coun¬ 
cil and school board races. 
Several significant conclusions emerge from these election 
results. First, the white power structure no longer commanded 
Atlanta's biracial voting coalition. The city's white leaders were 
unable to unite white voters behind a single candidate; nor were they 
able to dictate where black leadership or voter support should go. 
Secondly, the black leadership group appears to have lost a significant 
degree of influence over black votes. In the general election, blacks 
failed to support the leadership-endorsed candidate for President of 
City Council. Two-thirds of the black electorate cast ballots in the 
run-off for the vice-mayoral candidate opposed by black leaders. Fur¬ 
thermore, it is doubtful that black leadership support increased 
Maynard Jackson's black votes by any significant number. In addition, 
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Jackson's black votes swept him to victory; he did not need white votes 
to win. Nevertheless, the black electorate did not maximize its voting 
potential because not as many black candidates in City Council or Board 
of Education races were elected as there could have been elected. 
Black voters cast their ballots in a clear commitment to biracial 
government in Atlanta. 
During the years between the 1969 city elections and the 1973 
municipal races which produced Atlanta's first black mayor, black 
Atlantans held more potential for operationalizing their political 
power than ever before. Yet, in the behavior of the black electorate 
and of the black leadership, there was evident no organized, systematic 
attempt to develop and have adopted an agenda of items designed to 
solve the fundamental problems of their community. Black elected offi¬ 
cials' efforts were limited to decrying the existence of discrimination 
within city government and to securing a share of benefits within the 
established priorities of that structure, benefits which did not accrue 
to the masses of black Atlantans. There lacked the initiative to alter 
those priorities in a way which would meet the needs of the city's 
black citizens. It becomes painfully clear that—black officeholders 
and black leadership notwithstanding—policies were initiated, adopted 
and pursued which proved harmful and sometimes inimical to the black 
community. 
Moreover, this period witnessed the demise of organizational 
exchange between the black community and the city's white power struc¬ 
ture, its business and commercial elite. Black voters in 1969 began to 
vote independently for candidates and departed from their leadership- 
sponsored biracial voting coalition. By 1973» blacks no longer needed 
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the cues of "black leadership in order to cast their ballots. The 
leadership had demonstrated repeatedly its inability to secure 
community-wide benefits for the masses of black Atlantans. Leadership 
groups went unheeded generally as they sought to broker black voter 
support over which they had increasingly diminished control. 
That is not to say that black leadership was eliminated in the 
1973 elections. The old leadership of the 1960s was seriously under¬ 
cut; their constituency having defected. With the election of several 
more black officeholders, there appeared to be in 1973 the potential 
for additions to the existing leadership group or, perhaps, an emerging 
new black leadership. At any rate, this period witnessed the death of 
organizational exchange and the decimation of the established black 
leadership exchange in Atlanta, Georgia. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
As stated in the introductory chapter, this study attempts to 
investigate the nature of "black electoral behavior in Atlanta, Georgia. 
The foregoing discussion has been a review of the potential political 
power of blacks in the city during several periods, their voting 
behavior in municipal elections, the configurations of political leader¬ 
ship in the community and the development of political organization 
among black citizens. Having examined the history of black political 
activity from the period of disfranchisement through to the election of 
Atlanta's first black mayor, it is important to turn now to an assess¬ 
ment of that political behavior. This will be undertaken in view of the 
criteria for operationalizing or maximizing black political power and 
of the applicability of the exchange theory of groups to the history of 
black political activity in Atlanta. 
First, it must be remembered that black political life is char¬ 
acterized by the relationship between black and white Americans and the 
concomitant efforts of each group either to maintain or to eradicate 
the structure of this superordinate-subordinate relationship. Black 
politics, unlike that of other groups, is distinguished by the institu¬ 
tionalized subordination of blacks by whites. As argued by Mack H. 
Jones in his discussion of black empowerment, it, consequently: 
is theoretically useful to conceptualize black politics as 
a power struggle between whites bent on maintaining their 
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position of dominance and blacks struggling to escape this 
dominance.^ 
In this context, it is pertinent to recall the criteria out¬ 
lined for use in evaluating the operationalization or maximization of 
black political power. These are: l) securing benefits for people in 
the community; 2) preventing the formation of policy which is adverse 
to the interests of blacks; and 3) developing and including (or having 
included) in the policy-making process an agenda of items designed to 
ameliorate the fundamental social, economic and political problems of 
black people. Such actions represent the essential tools for blacks— 
elected officials in particular—to devise and augment political power 
on behalf of their constituent community. 
Furthermore, it is important to recollect those major tenets of 
exchange theory. Critical to the exchange process are the entrepre¬ 
neurial role of leadership in group formation, the benefits which make 
possible the exchange between groups, and the satisfactory flow of such 
benefits without which the exchange formation breaks down. Central to 
this process are a large group which is impoverished relatively, a 
dominant group that controls sufficient resources, and limited channels 
of communication between the two. Finally, this analysis will examine 
the applicability of black political activity in Atlanta to the three 
stages of exchange group formation. The first stage is characterized 
by the lack of group formation due to the potential group's large size 
and lack of resources. The second phase includes the operation of 
organization(s) based on political exchange. The breakdown of the 
^Mack H. Jones, "Black Political Empowerment in Atlanta: Myth 
and Reality," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Sciences, V. 439 (September 1978), p. 92. 
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exchange process, resulting from increased voter sophistication or 
large numbers of candidates able to communicate directly with voters, 
marks the third stage. The only other point that remains to be 
stressed is that organizations depend heavily on solidary and purposive 
benefits because of a scarcity of selective material benefits. 
For the first half of the twentieth century, blacks were unable 
to vote in those elections where policy-making officials were selected. 
Though effectively disfranchised, black Atlantans were not politically 
dormant. There were efforts to register, educate and organize black 
voters. Able to vote only in general, open and special elections— 
though not in the decisive party primaries—black electoral participa¬ 
tion was severely circumscribed. Also during this period, black socio¬ 
economic status was depressed; the bulk of black citizens had low levels 
of education and income and worked in menial occupations. 
Communications between black and white societies was almost 
nil; blacks were consulted seldom and only in situations where their 
vote would be critical to the outcome of an election. Due in part to 
legally mandated segregation and the "legitimacy" of separate-and- 
unequal facilities, there was a pervasive pressure against the alloca¬ 
tion of benefits and services to the black community. Thus, reward 
incentives for black political participation were scarce and, conse¬ 
quently, the barriers to political organization were mammoth. 
Yet, there was a degree of racial consciousness among blacks 
which was evident in the few instances where they could vote. In the 
1921 school bond referendum, blacks were instrumental in its success on 
the second ballot, after having been promised a portion of the revenues 
for facilities for black children. Again in 1932, blacks voted in 
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their interests by casting ballots against an effort to recall an incum¬ 
bent mayor who—at least—had expressed a concern for the "fair treat¬ 
ment of all citizens regardless of color." In an age when it was 
anathema to solicit black support, black voters provided voting margins 
to winning candidates who campaigned among them in 1929 and in 19^6. 
Despite these efforts, the benefits available to blacks and 
their electorate size—it was minimal relative to the numbers of white 
voters—were vastly restricted. Accompanied by legislated barriers to 
black voting as well as other factors, the elements necessary for 
organizational exchange were not sufficient for its establishment. 
Even so, there were efforts to organize black voters. This was 
most evident in the formation of the Atlanta Civic and Political League 
and the Citizens Democratic Club of Fulton County. Though designed to 
encourage blacks to secure concessions for meeting community needs, 
these groups had few benefits to offer blacks for their membership 
costs, that is, participation in the group. Resources were controlled 
by whites in Atlanta's power structure—those who had little inclina¬ 
tion or need to avail these resources to blacks. 
Black Atlantans constituted a large latent group unable to 
organize. They were powerless to levy sanctions in order to promote 
their interests largely because the most effective instrument—the 
vote—was generally unavailable. The period from the early 1900s up to 
19^-6 • thus, reflects a phase prior to the possibility of political 
exchange based on electoral organization. 
With the 19^6 judicial decision invalidating Georgia's white 
primary, blacks registered to vote in larger numbers than ever before. 
By the eve of that year's gubernatorial election, enough blacks had 
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registered to vote to comprise twenty-seven percent of Atlanta's voting 
population. However, Hack voters remained essentially unorganized for 
the next three years. There were no municipal elections during this 
time and few opportunities in which votes could be exchanged for 
benefits. 
Contrary to traditional interest group theory, new groups hop¬ 
ing to represent this fresh bloc of voters did not emerge. Rather, the 
period between 1946 and 1949 conforms to exchange theory and, more 
specifically, to the first stage as predicted by Murray and Vedlitz. 
The voter organizations of the past—the Atlanta Civic and Political 
League and the Fulton County Citizens Democratic Club—continued to 
exist and were maintained minimally. Yet, the voters remained largely 
disunited as evidenced in the clash between black Democrats and black 
Republicans. 
In 1949, however, black partisans merged to form the Atlanta 
Negro Voters League (ANVL). Designed as a voters' organization, the 
ANVL emerged in the ensuing years as the leadership group which facili¬ 
tated exchange between the black community and the white power elite 
that controlled the city's government and commerce. 
Facing re-election in 1949, Mayor William Hartsfield campaigned 
against a popular candidate. He won re-election largely because of the 
overwhelming black vote in his behalf. This event probably marks the 
beginning of the black-white exchange in Atlanta. At the same time, 
other white candidates began campaigning among blacks, something 
hitherto rarely done and previously akin to political suicide. Subse¬ 
quent to this election, blacks began requesting services and conces¬ 
sions from city government. Many benefits were granted in exchange for 
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black voter support at the polls. This exchange process became the 
pattern in mayoral elections after 19^9—those re-electing Hartsfield 
in 1953 and 1957 and the elections that carried Ivan Allen to the 
mayoral seat in 1961 and 1965. 
The conditions facilitating this exchange included the facts 
that: l) blacks remained largely poor and at the bottom of the socio¬ 
economic scale, putting them in a position where they lacked and needed 
resources; 2) blacks constituted a sizeable voting bloc—enough to 
influence the outcome of an election—and black votes were needed by 
the white business and commercial elite in order to retain their con¬ 
trol of city government; 3) because of this need, the power structure 
was less vulnerable to pressures inhibiting them from making small con¬ 
cessions to blacks; 4) also because of their need for votes, the white 
power ascendants were more willing to communicate with blacks—though 
not with the entire community directly—in order to obtain their sup¬ 
port; and 5) in a number of these elections, there were conservative 
candidates supported by more reactionary elements whose bids for office 
threatened the interests of black voters more than the retention of 
moderate, white-elite-supported candidates. 
The black leadership which brokered the exchange between black 
voters and the white leadership was provided by the Voters League. 
Largely through their Screening Committee and the use of mass- 
distributed "tickets"—slates of recommended candidates—the League 
controlled exchange. While "delivering" the black vote to the power 
structure's candidates, this group served to secure benefits for the 
black community. In addition to making requests of the city adminis¬ 
trations , these black leaders would express concern for issues to white 
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candidates in Screening Committee presentations. In this manner, the 
interests of the black community were communicated to whites as support 
was implied for those white candidates. Furthermore, because these 
black leaders controlled access by blacks to whites in power, the ANVL 
was known as the clearinghouse for black problems. Blacks knew that 
going through the League was the most auspicious method to solve a prob- 
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lem with or get a concession from the white community. 
Of the benefits garnered by the Atlanta Negro Voters League 
leadership, few were individual, material benefits. It has been inti- 
3 
mated that these were reserved largely for the black leaders. The 
black community as a whole, rather, shared the material benefits of 
paved streets, improved school facilities, lights, sewers and sidewalks. 
Purposive benefits—those which accrue indivisibly to a group—included 
the first hirings of black policemen and firemen, reduction of police 
brutality, abatement of discriminatory treatment at the hands of city 
and courtroom officials, as well as the reported suppression of some 
white supremacist groups. The solidary benefits, deriving from group 
association such as status and group identification, were available and 
enjoyed by those blacks who joined and participated in League activities 
and even more so by those members whose status was enhanced by inclusion 
in the organization's leadership. 
Throughout the 1950s and into the early 1960s, the Atlanta 
2 
Interview with Robert Brisbane, Ph.D., Chairman, Political 
Science Department, Morehouse College, March 26, 19?6. 
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Negro Voters League facilitated black-white organizational voter 
exchange. Evidently, for several years there was a mutually satisfac¬ 
tory flow between the two communities because black voters continued to 
follow the League’s cues at election time and because the white power 
elite acknowledged—through their use of the League as a conduit to the 
black community—the influence of that organization. 
In assessing the extent to which power was operationalized dur¬ 
ing these years, it is important to note that in addition to the bene¬ 
fits outlined above, the black leadership neither formulated and opera¬ 
tionalized a black agenda nor was able to prevent the development or 
sustenance of policy adverse to the interests of the black community. 
The fact that segregation persisted is evidence of their inability to 
influence policy either in City Hall or in the larger community. 
It may be that by the decade of the 1960s, the black citizenry 
became dissatisfied with the inability or unwillingness of the League 
leadership to attack segregation or with its ineffectiveness in secur¬ 
ing more substantial benefits for the broader community. With the 
advent of the Civil Rights Movement in Atlanta, blacks began to support 
the efforts of new, emerging leaders who confronted the white business 
and commercial elite with demands to dismantle Jim Crow policies of 
racial separation. The influence of the Atlanta Negro Voters League 
waned and a younger generation of influential blacks commanded the 
attention of the white power structure and the votes of black citizens. 
League leaders could no longer articulate the desires of blacks or 
direct the sanctions blacks levied against uncompromising white estab¬ 
lishments. The unobtrusive appeals of the old black leaders gave way 
to the integrationist demands supported by the majority of black 
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Atlantans. Thus, the Civil Rights Movement precipitated a shift of 
influence from the Atlanta Negro Voters League to the leadership of a 
new group, the Atlanta Summit Leadership Conference (ASLC). 
The Conference was not a voter organization as the League had 
been. Further, the organization per se did not assume the screening 
and recommendation function of the older group. The individuals who 
were at the helm of the ASLC, however, did assume on an informal basis 
the broker function performed previously by the ANVL. By the mid- 
1960s, this "New Guard" was interacting with the city’s white leaders 
on behalf of the black community and was providing cues for the black 
electorate to follow at election time. Though the new black leadership 
group was less conservative in its style and its requests for benefits, 
the exchange process largely remained intact. They still were 
described as "junior" partners in the black-white coalition, suggesting 
that once integration was achieved the "New Guard" followed the initia¬ 
tives of the white power elite and provided black support where and 
when it was expected. 
The benefits obtained by this new leadership remained qualita¬ 
tively unchanged. That is, blacks received few individual, material 
benefits and some purposive concessions for the community; yet, the 
superordinate-subordinate structure of socioeconomic and political 
relationships remained intact. No black agenda was initiated or opera¬ 
tionalized; neither was policy inimical to black interests thwarted by 
black leaders through the 1960s. 
In toto, the years from 19^-9 up to the 1969 elections conform 
to the second stage predicted by exchange theorists where organiza¬ 
tional—black voters are organized as a group united behind a particular 
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leadership—political exchange occurs based on a mutually satisfactory 
flow of benefits and votes. Outside subsidization, in the form of 
resources and benefits supplied by the white power structure, did pro¬ 
vide start-up costs with which black leadership organized its troops. 
There were two phases to this exchange process—one with formal organi¬ 
zation of black voters and the second with informal cohesion of blacks 
as a voting bloc. Despite the differences in formal organization, the 
process remained essentially the same. The different leadership groups 
performed the same functions with respect to the political exchange 
process. Only the style and, perhaps, the degree of demands were dif¬ 
ferent. Qualitatively, vis-a-vis the power relationships between 
whites and blacks, the benefits sought were alike. 
On the eve of the 1969 municipal elections, black voters con¬ 
trolled a significant share of electoral power in Atlanta. Both the 
black and white leadership groups were aware of this fact. For the 
first time in the history of the black-white coalition, whose merger 
had been formulated by black and white leaders to elect white- 
designated city administrations, black leaders rejected the white power 
structure's mayoral candidate and supported, instead, another white 
hopeful rather than the black aspirant to the mayor's post. 
The ballot counts from the city’s black precincts attested to 
an even more meaningful split. The black electorate not only repudiated 
the white leadership candidate, but almost half of the blacks casting 
ballots—in the general election—did so on the behalf of the black 
mayoral candidate, rejecting the black leadership's choice for mayor as 
well. Furthermore,in the race for vice-mayor, black voters supported 
overwhelmingly a candidate not backed by black leaders. In the run-off 
115 
election for mayor, the black electorate opposed the white power struc¬ 
ture's anointee for mayor, providing the victory for the black leader¬ 
ship’s candidate choice. 
The long-established voters' exchange with the city's white 
business and commercial elite had broken down in both races for 
Atlanta's top governmental posts. The generation-long coalition had 
ruptured. Large numbers of black voters, for the first time since 
being enfranchised meaningfully, ignored the cues which for so long had 
made them partners in political exchange. 
Even so, the break was not complete. In the intervening years 
between the 1969 and 1973 municipal elections, some political exchange 
did occur among black voters and the white power structure which con¬ 
tinued to command substantial resources and control the city's economic 
life. This exchange was negotiated by black leaders among whom were 
those who had ascended to power on the wave of the Civil Rights Move¬ 
ment as well as newly-elected black officials who had emerged since 
then. Benefits for blacks were negotiated and, in turn, black voters 
supported the referendum authorizing a rapid transit system. Blacks, 
because of black representation in the county delegation to the state 
legislature, were able to secure representation on the city charter 
commission. 
Yet, in spite of the electoral strength of the black community, 
benefits for blacks remained limited. The kinds of concessions which 
would produce more equitable socioeconomic conditions between the races 
still were not forthcoming from whites who controlled vast resources. 
What is worse is that in the deliberations for the rapid transit system 
and for a new city charter, blacks participated in the policy-making 
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which proved inimical to hlack interests. In the case of the Metropoli¬ 
tan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, the system was financed hy a most 
regressive sales tax increase for which hlack leaders campaigned. The 
new city charter—resulting in redistricting that reduced the potential 
number and scope of hlack elected city legislators—was adopted with 
the approval of hlack officeholders and political leaders. 
Furthermore, hlack elected officials appeared ineffective in 
instances where policy-making and implementation could have been or, in 
fact, was harmful to the hlack community. Their inability to halt 
police brutality against blacks and their failure to impede the annexa¬ 
tion proposal—designed to dilute hlack voting strength—are witnesses 
to the fact that maximization of hlack political power in Atlanta hy 
the early 1970s was minimal. 
The efforts hy hlack leaders during these years were not 
totally ineffectual. Some successes had been scored in attacks against 
discrimination in city government and in efforts to secure some con¬ 
tracts for blacks. Nevertheless, these concessions hardly constituted 
an equitable share of benefits for blacks. Neither did they alter, in 
any way, the subordination of blacks to the power or ascendance of 
Atlanta's white population. 
Furthermore, though making a nascent effort at forging an orga¬ 
nization with the potential for developing a black agenda, black 
leaders showed no progress in this regard. The city's most influential 
blacks lacked a cogent slate of policy alternatives for solving the 
fundamental and critical social and economic problems of their own com¬ 
munity. Therefore, while the potential for maximizing black political 
power had increased—as evidenced in the increased black population and 
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electorate size, in the reduction of gaps in educational attainment and 
income between whites and blacks, and in the election of more blacks to 
city government posts—this potential had not been realized in the 
years between 1969 and 1973» 
The results of the municipal elections held in 1973 evidenced 
a culmination of the rupture in the political exchange which first 
appeared in the 1969 campaigns. None of the traditional elements for 
exchange were negotiated in the race for mayor. In fact, roles were 
interchanged somewhat when black leaders presented their choice for the 
chief executive position to the white business and commercial elite for 
white support. Yet, the roles were not exactly reversed, for blacks 
controlled no resources to offer whites except, perhaps, for the 
patronage which might come with the mayor's office. Even so, Maynard 
Jackson appeared unwilling to commit anything in exchange for voter 
support from the white leadership group.^ Jackson, moreover, won the 
mayoral race on the strength of the black vote even though he did 
receive significant—though not quite one-third—white voter support and 
grudging white leadership backing. 
The most telling data, however, come from the election for City 
Council President. In this race, the black leadership may have attempted 
to broker white support for mayoral hopeful Jackson while, in return, 
discouraging a serious black candidacy for council president and 
delivering black votes to the white designee. The "deal," as it was 
referred to, apparently was repudiated by more than half of the blacks 
casting ballots for this race in both the general and run-off elections. 
5 
Interview with Mayor Maynard Jackson, 10 March 1975- 
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They cast a majority of their votes in the first contest and two-thirds 
in the second for a "black candidate who entered the campaign after the 
"deal" was made public and who was opposed by black political brokers. 
In fact, even among those blacks who did not vote for the black candi¬ 
date, most of them voted for a white aspirant who also was not either 
leadership group's choice. Thus, at least ninety percent of blacks 
voting in the general election for President of the City Council 
rejected the cues given by black leaders. 
Moreover, statistics from the 1969 and 1973 elections for Board 
of Aldermen and City Council posts show that black and white voters 
generally opposed each other. In these races, there was little evi¬ 
dence of a coalition or of political exchange. Statistical studies of 
city elections by Hardon and Rooks as well as an analysis of voting 
patterns in the Fifth District Congressional races disprove the myth of 
mutuality in the so-called coalition. The absence of significant white 
support for black candidates persists over time and in different types 
of elections extending beyond municipal posts to include congressional 
and county elections as well.^ 
Evidence from these elections—especially the 1973 council 
presidency—suggests a dismantling of the political exchange among 
Atlanta's business and commercial elite, black leaders and the black 
^Statistical analyses of voting patterns in municipal elections 
include Berdie Ricks Hardon, "A Statistical Analysis of the Black-White 
Voting Coalition in Atlanta 19^-9 to 1970" (Master's thesis, Georgia 
State University, 1972); and Charles S. Rooks, The Atlanta Elections of 
1969 (Atlanta: Voter Education Project, Inc., 1970), pp. 58-63, 70. 
Evidence for refuting the claim of white voter support for black candi¬ 
dates in coalition style also can be found in Marilyn Ann Davis, 
"Political Participation in Georgia's Fifth Congressional District: An 
Analysis of Racial and Socioeconomic Voting Patterns, 19^6 to 1978" 
(Ph.D. dissertation, Atlanta University, 1979)* PP* 195* 227. 
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electorate. Few cues given by black influentials attempting to broker 
black votes were heeded by the black electorate. It appears that in 
the races for the two most powerful positions candidates were able to 
communicate directly with and secure the votes of blacks. 
One might suggest that black voters had reached a level of 
sophistication at which they no longer needed the cues of black leaders 
to vote for candidates disposed to act on their behalf or for candi¬ 
dates least opposed to their interests. While that may hold some 
truth, it must be remembered that black voters did not exercise their 
maximum electoral strength by carrying as many blacks to office as pos¬ 
sible. Had they voted in sufficient numbers or voted more heavily for 
black aspirants than for whites, more blacks could have won City Council 
and Board of Education seats. Black voters heeded the urgings of the 
white-controlled media and some black leaders for biracial government. 
The whites elected with black votes over black hopefuls may have had, 
at best, questionable intent to pursue the interests of their black con¬ 
stituency. Therefore, the sophistication premise is arguable. 
It can be concluded, however, that the political exchange forged 
decades before the election of Atlanta's first black mayor had suc¬ 
cumbed by 1973- As exchange theory predicts, whether because of large 
numbers of candidates who appealed directly to voters or because of a 
new level of sophistication, black leaders no longer were able to con¬ 
trol and command the black electorate. Black voters demonstrated the 
ability, independent of black leaders, to support substantially a num¬ 
ber of candidates who appeared to be inclined to promote black 
interests. 
Whether these officials will be disposed to or able to maximize 
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black Atlantans' potential for political power remains to be seen. For 
years, black efforts and potential strength yielded few resources 
capable of ameliorating the problems manifested by the depressed black 
socioeconomic status. Yet, more than an equitable share of benefits is 
needed. Clearly, where one group suffers at the superordination of 
another group, the power relationships must be altered in order to 
relieve the fundamental problems of the subordinate group. Black 
Atlantans, at the close of the 1973 municipal elections, had some poten¬ 
tial for developing the power needed to shift priorities to meet their 
needs. 
This potential suggests, moreover, a critical consideration of 
the applicability of the exchange theory of group behavior. The 
exchange theory provides an appropriate framework for the study of 
rational and purposive group electoral behavior in pursuit of benefits. 
However, this analysis of black electoral behavior in Atlanta suggests 
an element that is not adequately addressed in exchange theory. That 
element is the group's pursuit, maximization and consolidation of 
political power. 
What is more, this element is critical where it involves a 
group whose political, economic, social and cultural status has been 
conditioned by deliberate and systematic oppression. In this case, 
group electoral behavior is directed not only at the acquisition of 
benefits; it encompasses a drive toward participation in the decision¬ 
making process that controls the distribution of benefits. In other 
words, the pursuit of political power seeks not only a piece of the pie 
but requires a role in dividing and distributing the pie. 
Furthermore, such a modification is even more important because 
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of the nature and consequences of the superordinate-subordinate rela¬ 
tionship between the races. Because this relationship is a fundamental 
characteristic of American politics, efforts by the oppressed to 
acquire power and to reorder equitably society's priorities must be 
identified as a specific, overarching goal that challenges the very 
nature of current power relationships. 
The question, then, for exchange theory is whether it is 
limited to explaining political behavior that is assumed to be pluralist 
or whether it can account for political activity that seeks to reorder 
power relationships. That question will remain unanswered here. Its 
consideration requires an extensive explication and rigorous examina¬ 
tion of exchange theory which is not appropriate for this analysis. 
What this study does suggest is the expansion and development 
of exchange theory and a systematic analysis of its applicability to 
political behavior. Exchange theory, in this instance, proved useful 
for understanding patterns of black electoral behavior in Atlanta but 
remains limited in its explanation of long-range goals designed to 
maximize power as well as acquire benefits. 
This discussion seeks to clarify one's understanding of the 
nature of black politics in Atlanta. Its purpose does not presume to 
suggest prescriptions for the utility of the electoral process for 
solving the problems of blacks. The conclusions, it is hoped, raise 
questions rather than prescribe action. These questions involve the 
capacity and limitations of electoral politics for providing not just 
benefits but the means of reordering priorities so that the distribu¬ 
tion of society's resources will be equitable. 
The needs of the black community require more than reordered 
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priorities, however. They demand, a qualitative change in the nature of 
power relationships. More specifically, power suggests control of eco¬ 
nomic as well as political resources. The electoral process appears 
limited in its access to resources generated outside of the political 
institutions served hy voting. 
If the black community is to acquire the power that will permit 
a solution to its fundamental problems, it is critical to understand 
the sources of that power and the utility of any political behavior for 
maximizing that power. The successes and failures of electoral poli¬ 
tics pose these questions. The task of answering them belongs to black 
leaders, black elected officials and, most importantly, to black voters. 
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